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This thesis investigates the proximate determinants of the observed differences in levels and 
growth rates of output per worker across the 69 major cities in China during 1994-2010, and 
asks the following two questions to develop a better understanding of the regional economic 
development and growth in the second largest economy of the world: (i) Why are some cities 
so much richer than others? (ii) What drives economic growth in Chinese cities? I utilise growth 
and development accounting approaches to answer these questions. I find that growth in the 
first-tier cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen) enjoy the highest contribution 
from total factor productivity (TFP) growth. I find a clear distinction between Tier-1 cities and 
the rest. In terms of growth rates, growth in Tier-1 cities is driven primarily by TFP growth. 
On the other hand, TFP growth contributes a lot less to growth in Tier-2 and 3 cities. Growth 
in Tier-2 and 3 cities depends overwhelmingly on accumulation of physical capital. Rapid 
accumulation of physical capital in Tier-2 cities has not closed the gap in income levels 
between them and Tier-1 cities. Similarly, growth in human capital has played a minor role. In 
terms of income levels, I find that TFP levels are highly correlated with income levels in 2010. 
I also find a declining role of variation in factor endowments in explaining variation in income 
levels. My results cast doubt on the long-run sustainability of growth in the second- and the 
third-tier cities as they have relied too much on physical capital deepening. In order to avoid a 
growth slow-down in the future, Chinese cities should focus more on improving productivity 
and less on capital deepening. Productivity growth is not only crucial for the sustainability of 
economic reform programs in the short term but also a major factor for China to converge to 
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One of the well-known facts of the economic growth and development literature is that there 
are significant differences in output per worker across countries. Considerable progress has 
been made in diagnosing the proximate sources of this variation (see, for example, Klenow and 
Rodríguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005; Hsieh and Klenow, 2010; Jones 
and Romer, 2010; Jones, 2016). Relatively not much attention has been paid to the substantial 
income differences among the states or the cities within a country.1,2 This is surprising since 
there are significant variations in output per worker within countries as well.  
 
Consider the United States, the frontier economy. The variation in GDP per capita across the 
US states is quite large. Figure 1 shows the distribution of GDP per capita in 1997 and 2016 
for 50 states in the US.3 ,4  The richest state in 2016 is Massachusetts, while the poorest 
Mississippi. At $65,545, GDP per capita in Massachusetts is twice as high as that in Mississippi 
($31,881). Average annual growth rates between 1997 and 2016 range from 3.65% in North 
Dakota to -0.49% in Nevada.5 In 2016, the standard deviation in state incomes is $8,765, which 
is more than 18% of average national income. This indicates that states have clearly reached 
                                               
1 There is an active research agenda to assemble data on output and the stocks of physical and human capital for 
US states from 1840 to 2000 (Turner et al., 2007, 2013). Tamura (2012) uses these new data and present 
development accounting results for output per worker at the level of the states of the US. Jerzmanowski (2017), 
using the same dataset, studies the relationship between financial development and the state’s level of 
development. 
2  Acemoglu and Dell (2010) document the magnitudes of cross-country, cross-municipality, and within-
municipality inequality in labour incomes for the Americas (Canada, Latin America, and the US). Chanda (2011) 
notes that income gaps among Indian states are large, persistent and increasing over time and investigates if 
differences in technology can account for the observed income gaps across Indian states. 
3 I use the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regional economic accounts. Per capita real GDP (chained 2009 
dollars) by state is GDP of a given area divided by the resident population of the area. The data start from 1997 
(https://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm). See also Hanushek et al. (2017) for a similar analysis. 
4 The line in the middle of each box depicts the median. The bottom and top of each box indicate the states at the 
25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. Dots indicate large outliers (Alaska and Delaware). 
5 That is, while North Dakota’s GDP per capita increased by 98% – lifting it from 43rd to 6th in the national state 
ranking – Nevada’s GDP per capita decreased by 9% – making it drop from 6th to 35th. 
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very different levels of development in the US. Such a perspective can be applied to other 
countries as well.  
 
In this thesis I look at the cities within mainland China. China is the most populous country in 
the world, with 1.4 billion citizens in 2016, which is close to 20% of the world population.6 In 
addition, China has been undergoing rapid urbanisation since 1978. Figure 2 shows the share 
of total population living in urban areas in the five most populous countries in the world during 
1960-2016.7 The urbanisation rate in China was less than 20% between 1960 and 1980, ranging 
between 16.2% and 19.4%. It has risen dramatically in the post-19808 period and reached 57% 
in 2016. China, as Figure 2 indicates, presents a unique opportunity to study the economic 
development experiences of different cities within a country. 
 
There are enormous income differences across the major cities in China. Figure 3 plots GDP 
per worker (in 1994 prices) in 1994, 2001, 2008, and 2015 for the 69 major cities of China.9 
Dots indicate large outliers outside of the normal data range (Shenzhen in all four years, 
Guangzhou in 2008, Ningbo in 2001, and Xiamen in 1994). The richest city in 2015 is 
Shenzhen while the poorest is Nanchong. GDP per worker in Shenzhen is nearly 22 times of 
that in Nanchong. The second richest city in 2015, Guangzhou, is more than 9 times as rich as 
Nanchong. There is also significant variation in growth rates. Hohhot has the highest growth 
rate in output per worker. Average annual growth rates between 1994 and 2015 range from 
                                               
6 India (1.32 billion), the United States (323 million), Indonesia (261 million), and Brazil (208 million) follow 
China as the most populous countries in 2016. All data are from the World Bank (2017). 
7 I use the variable “Urban population (% of total)” from the World Bank (2017). Urban population refers to 
people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population 
estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects. 
8 India’s urbanisation rate was higher than that of China during 1960-1988. China surpassed India in 1989, and 
has surged ahead since then. 
9 Appendix A.1 lists these 69 cities. The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) briefly talks about its 
selection criteria for the 70 cities at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjzs/cjwtjd/201308/t20130829_74324.html. These 
criteria include, among others, city size and influence. The exact criteria, however, are not published. 
 9
13.28% in Hohhot (lifting it from 58th to 9th in the sample) to 4.10% in Haikou (going down 
from 4th to 46th).  
 
Two observations stand out upon inspection of Figure 3. First, labour productivity (output per 
worker) varies significantly across cities. The poorest city in 2015 has a lower output per 
worker than that enjoyed by Shenzhen in 1994. Second, variation in labour productivity has 
been increasing over time, as can be seen by the widening box-and-whisker graphs. These 
observations clearly indicate that cities have reached very different levels of development in 
China. 
 
This thesis investigates the proximate determinants of the observed differences in levels and 
growth rates of output per worker across the 69 major cities in China during 1994-2010, and 
asks the following two questions to develop a better understanding of the regional economic 
development and growth in the second largest economy of the world: (i) Why are some cities 
so much richer than others? (ii) What drives economic growth in Chinese cities? I utilise growth 
and development accounting approaches to answer these questions. Growth accounting looks 
at growth rates, and asks what has contributed to a city’s growth over time. I break down 
individual cities’ growth in labour productivity by accounting for what percentage of economic 
growth comes from capital (physical and human) accumulation and technological changes. On 
the other hand, development accounting looks at levels, and compares differences in factor 
endowments and total factor productivity (TFP) levels in determining differences in income 
levels. I pursue a development accounting analysis to decompose variations in output per 
worker across cities in China.  
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This thesis makes two contributions. First, I construct a detailed dataset covering 69 major 
cities in China over the period 1994-2010. Reliable and comparable data construction has been 
a challenge for the Chinese economy. I provide a comprehensive discussion regarding the 
construction of the dataset because across the China literature, the raw data used, the methods, 
and the assumptions vary greatly. My dataset contains data for (real) output, employment, (real) 
capital stock, and human capital per worker. Together they enable me to perform accounting 
exercises in growth rates and levels. Second, this thesis, to the best of my knowledge, is the 
first study which presents growth and development accounting exercises that focus on the 69 
major cities of China. The advantage of focusing on these major cities is that my quantitative 
analysis allows for a 3-tier breakdown as defined by NBS. I am able to not only study each city 
individually, but also look at each tier as a separate group. 
 
I find that growth in Tier-1 cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen) is sustainable 
in the long-run as growth in these cities is driven mostly by TFP growth. On the other hand, 
growth in the second- and third-tier cities may be unsustainable in the long-run since growth 
in these cities is driven mostly by factor accumulation. As Krugman (1994a, p. 13) puts it, 
“productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything.” Given my findings, 
past rates of economic growth in many Chinese cities are unlikely to be sustained if they fail 
to improve their productive capacity and technological capabilities. In terms of income levels, 
I find that output per worker levels are highly correlated with TFP levels in 2010. I also find 
that variation in factor endowments has a declining role in explaining variation in output per 
worker levels across cities. 
 
This thesis is organised into the following chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on growth 
and development accounting at the national, provincial, and municipal (city) levels in China. 
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Chapter 3 provides some background information on cities in China. Chapter 4 provides a 
comprehensive methodology of the dataset constructed in this thesis. This dataset consists of 
original annual measures for physical and human capital for each city in the sample. Chapter 5 
explains in detail how growth and development accounting are conducted. Chapter 6 presents 
the results from the accounting exercises. Chapter 7 concludes, providing a policy-focused 
analysis of the quantitative findings. This thesis uses the studies and data sources written in 
English and Chinese. References that are written in Chinese are documented in a separate 

















2. A Brief Literature Review 
The method of growth accounting was first introduced by Solow (1957) and later developed 
by Kendrick (1961) and especially by Denison (1967). Solow’s (1957) article not only 
developed the growth accounting framework but also applied it to U.S. data to understand the 
sources of growth during the early 20th century. Solow’s conclusion is that a large part of the 
growth was due to technological progress. An extensive literature has grown out of Solow’s 
work, studying how much of growth is attributable to the accumulation of physical (and human 
capital), and how much is the result of productivity growth. For example, Mankiw et al. (1992) 
argue that a simple neoclassical model can explain up to 80% of the cross-country variation in 
the log of per capita GDP, especially if it incorporates differences in human capital investment 
across countries. Krugman (1994b) argues that East Asia’s economic miracle is driven largely 
by factor accumulation. He argues that this is analogous to the Soviet growth experience and 
therefore unsustainable. Young (1995) claims that most of the extraordinary growth 
performance of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea can be explained by factor 
accumulation, not technological progress. Hsieh (2002) argues that these results are no longer 
true once one corrects for the overestimates of capital accumulation in the data.10  
 
For the past nearly forty years, China has experienced, on average, annual real GDP growth of 
close to 10% and has become the second-largest economy in the world after the US. There has 
been an overwhelming interest in determining the proximate causes of growth in China. The 
consensus in the literature is that growth before 1978 was turbulent and productivity (proxied 
by TFP) growth was negative.11 For example, Chow (1993) finds that growth was driven by 
capital accumulation during 1952-1980 and TFP growth was absent. Borensztein and Ostry 
                                               
10 Aghion and Howitt (2009, Chapter 5) provide a comprehensive review of these discussions. 
11  Cheremukhin et al. (2017) show that economic growth and structural transformation during 1953-1978 
exhibited conspicuous fluctuations. 
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(1996) estimate that TFP growth was negative at about -0.7% per annum during 1953-1978. 
Similarly, Zhu (2012) finds that TFP deteriorated between 1952 and 1978, declining by 1.07% 
per annum. This finding corresponds with the consensus of under-urbanisation prior to 1978. 
 
After 1978, growth picked up pace and TFP began to rise steadily (Kehoe and Ruhl, 2010; Zhu, 
2012). Perkins and Rawski (2008) calculate TFP growth of 3.8% per year for 1978-2005, net 
of the contribution of rising education levels. There is debate on the exact trajectory of TFP 
since 1978. Researchers have attempted to measure the levels and growth rates of TFP for 
China at the national, provincial, and city levels.12,13 I provide a selected review of the literature 
on TFP for China at the national, provincial, and city level and where possible, emphasis is on 
the contemporary period as it overlaps the most with the period covered in this thesis. 
 
2.1 Studies at the National Level 
Zhang and Shi (2003) study the 1952-1998 period and find that the aggregate TFP level in 
1978 was actually lower than that in 1952. Since then, TFP has grown close to 3% per annum 
during 1979-1998, and contributed about 30% to growth.14 Guo and Jia (2005) study the 1979-
2004 period and find that TFP grew by about 0.9% on average per annum, which contributed 
almost 10% to growth. TFP growth slowed down after 1993 and picked up after 2000. Wang 
(2000) examines China’s growth since 1978 and finds large contributions from factor inputs. 
However, resource reallocation as a result of the reforms since 1978 also played a very 
significant role. Accordingly, Wang identifies urbanisation as the engine of China’s future 
growth. 
                                               
12 Yang (2013) presents a comprehensive literature review of the evolution of TFP in China. 
13  There are also sectoral studies linking the structural transformation experience of China to the sectoral 
productivity growth rates. China’s structural transformation experience has been studied extensively. See, among 
many others, Brandt et al., 2008; Dekle and Vandenbroucke, 2012; Cao and Birchenall, 2013. 
14 They also find evidence for constant returns to scale for China. 
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Xu and Shu (2009) study the 1979-2004 period. They employ the dual approach which uses 
factor prices instead of quantities to calculate TFP. They find that during the period of their 
study, TFP grew by 2.5% every year, and contributed about 25% to growth.15 TFP growth rate 
increased by 2-3 percentage points after 1992, which calls for further investigation.16 Shi and 
Hu (2008) study the role of information technology (IT) in driving China’s TFP growth during 
1980-2003. They also use the dual approach, and find an increasing role for IT in general. The 
contribution of IT, however, is limited to the hardware sector, and contribution from the 
software sector is low. Yi et al. (2003) criticise the view that TFP growth in China has been 
low. They argue that a large part of the efficiency improvement in developing countries comes 
from equipment purchases from developed countries, which is treated inaccurately as capital 
deepening. The authors are optimistic about China’s growth potential. The authors, however, 
do not provide calculations on China’s TFP growth. 
 
2.2 Studies at the Province Level 
Ye (2002) is the closest study to this thesis in terms of methodology. Ye utilises the Cobb-
Douglas production function and the Solow residual to study provincial TFP growth rates 
during 1978-1998. Ye finds that provinces with higher growth rates have higher contributions 
from capital deepening and less from TFP growth, whereas those with lower growth rates have 
lower contributions from capital deepening and more from TFP growth. The result is that TFP 
growth plays a bigger role in those provinces that are growing more slowly.17 Ye calls this the 
growth and TFP paradox. I find highest TFP contributions in Tier-1 cities which are not 
                                               
15 The average annual growth rate is approximately 10% during the period. 
16 This is consistent with a new wave of urbanisation which began in the 1990s. 
17 Brandt et al. (2013) list the TFP of the non-state and state sectors for each of the 27 provinces between 1985 
and 2007. They show that non-agricultural TFP in the state sector is generally constant in all provinces. In the 
non-state sector, non-agricultural TFP is continuously increasing and the cross-province dispersion is generally 
declining. 
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necessarily the slowest in growth. This could be because of the updated study period in this 
thesis. I do not find much correlation between TFP contributions and growth. Ye also finds 
little contribution from growth in human capital, which is consistent with the findings in this 
thesis. 
 
Unel and Zebregs (2009) decompose labour productivity growth in China’s provinces into 
three components: efficiency gains, technological progress, and capital deepening. They find 
that, on average, capital deepening accounts for about three-fourths of labour productivity 
growth in China’s provinces between 1978 and 1998.  Using the Malmquist Productivity Index 
(MPI) method18, Zheng and Hu (2005) find evidence for growth driven by technological 
progress at the province level. They separate the effects of technical change and improvements 
in efficiency, and find that TFP growth is mainly due to technical change, while efficiency has 
remained low in many parts of China. Other studies that use the MPI method at the province 
level include Yan and Wang (2004), Guo et al. (2005), and Fu and Bai (2009). These three 
studies find positive TFP growth for the whole country and the provinces. Yan and Wang find 
that growth prior to 1997 is mainly due to efficiency improvements. Guo et al. (2005) find 
diverging trends for provincial TFP growth, and attribute the cause to differences in technical 
change. Fu and Bai (2009) find that technical change and efficiency improvements have led 
TFP growth alternatingly.  
 
2.3 Studies at the City Level 
The literature on cities is relatively new, and smaller than that on provinces. Nevertheless, some 
interesting findings have started to emerge. Zhang (2014) studies 264 cities during 1990-2011 
                                               
18 MPI measures the productivity changes along with time variations and can be decomposed into changes in 
efficiency and technology with a nonparametric approach. 
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and finds that TFP growth is slowing down in recent years. He recommends policies that 
stimulate TFP growth, especially in eastern China, as TFP and output growth are strongly 
correlated in that part of the country.19 Studying 216 cities during 1990-2004, Li (2007) finds 
that TFP growth is mainly driven by technical change, not efficiency improvements. This 
contrasts with findings at the provincial and national level which give credit to efficiency 
improvements. Focusing on 216 cities during 1989-2000, Xu and Li (2004) find evidence for 
-convergence and unconditional -convergence (see Appendix A.12 for a discussion of these 
concepts). They also find that, whereas income levels have been diverging among provinces, 
they have actually been converging among cities. 
 
2.4 Contributions to the Literature 
My biggest contribution is the construction of a detailed dataset for 69 cities in China, which 
contains data on real output, physical capital, human capital, and employment. I also calculate 
labour’s share of income. Together these variables permit a basic accounting exercise in levels 
and growth rates. Physical capital20  and human capital21  deserve special attention. While 
national and provincial physical and human capital stock calculations abound across the China 
literature, the literature that considers city-specific physical and human capital stock 
calculations is more limited.  
 
I rely on the methods developed in Xiang (2011) to construct physical capital stock for cities. 
Xiang (2011), to the best of my knowledge, is the only detailed study on physical capital at the 
city level in China. Xiang covers the 1995-2009 period. I adopt her methodology and extend 
                                               
19 Note that Zhang uses output for total city instead of districts under city. 
20 In a recent ambitious project, Holz and Yue (2017) provide provincial and national calculations for physical 
capital series for the years since 1952, distinguishing between capital services and wealth capital stock. We both 
find exponential growth for capital stock series. 
21 Brandt et al. (2013) construct a panel data set, which includes physical and human capital estimates by province 
that spans the period between 1985 and 2007 and covers 27 out of 31 provinces in mainland China. 
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the period to cover the years between 1994 and 2015. Having said that, accounting exercises 
are only performed for the 1994-2010 period due to availability of human capital data. I rely 
on returns to schooling found in Peng (2011) to construct human capital series at the city level. 
I make use of the log-linear wage-schooling profile. Peng (2011), to the best of my knowledge, 
is the only study that studies returns to schooling at the city level in China. Furthermore, Peng 
finds increasing returns to schooling, which contrasts with decreasing returns often found in 
developed economies.  
 
Apart from physical and human capital, this thesis is also the first to study the levels and growth 
rates of city-level TFPs for the 69 major cities in China. The advantage of the 69-city sample 
is that it allows for a three-tier breakdown as defined by the NBS. Therefore, by focusing on 
the 69-cities, I do not only look at TFP for each city, but Tier 1-3 cities as separate groups as 
well. Indeed, one of the key findings of this thesis is that growth in Tier-1 cities is more 
sustainable than that in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities. TFP growth contributes over 50% to the growth 
of output per worker in Tier-1 cities, while it contributes a lot less in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities. 
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3. Background 
This chapter discusses some of the features of Chinese cities. Chapter 3.1 explains the concepts 
of “districts under city” and “total city” and their relevance to this thesis. Chapter 3.2 provides 
anecdotal and statistical evidence, which points to the very significant rise of urban China in 
recent decades. 
 
3.1 What is a City in China? 
Cities with more than 10 million inhabitants are often termed megacities. According to the 
United Nations, there are 31 megacities in the world in 2016, of which 6 are located in China 
(United Nations, 2016). There are no unified or standardised international criteria for 
determining the boundaries of a city and often different definitions are used. For example, the 
United Nations provides three definitions: (i) city proper, (ii) urban agglomeration, and (iii) 
metropolitan area. The city proper describes a city according to an administrative boundary. 
The urban agglomeration considers the extent of the contiguous urban area, or built-up area, 
to delineate the city’s boundaries. Finally, the metropolitan area defines its boundaries 
according to the degree of economic and social interconnectedness of nearby areas. The choice 
of how to define a city’s boundaries is consequential for assessing the size of its population. 
The following example from Canada illustrates this point.  
 
“In Toronto, Canada, for example, approximately 2.6 million people resided within the “city 
proper” according to the 2011 census, but the population of the surrounding “urban agglomeration” 
was almost twice as large, at 5.1 million, and the population of the “metropolitan area” was larger 
still, at 5.6 million.”                                                                                       (United Nations, 2016). 
 
 
The situation is more complex for China. A city is an administrative unit in China, with clearly-
defined borders. In this regard, the entire territory of China can be broken down into numerous 
 19 
cities.22 In general, cities in China consist of a contiguous, urbanised area called “districts under 
city”, surrounded by suburbs. Altogether, “districts under city” plus the suburbs are known as 
“total city”.23 The Yearbooks report almost all data in two parallel columns, one for “total city”, 
and the other for “districts under city”. As this thesis focuses on urban centres in China, all data 
are taken from “districts under city”. This is also in line with the literature.24 
 
Chan (2007) provides a very detailed analysis of the difficulties involved in properly defining 
a city in China. Due to data unavailability, a simplified treatment will suffice here. As described 
in the City Yearbooks, “total city” corresponds with the entire administrative area of a city. It 
is a political rather than an economic concept. “Districts under city”, on the other hand, exclude 
counties and county-level cities administered by a city. Therefore, it is a reasonable choice to 
use data for “districts under city” when studying urban areas in China. 
 
Another issue is the administrative status of a city. Cities in China fit into the following 
hierarchy, from top to bottom: province-level cities > provincial capitals > vice-province level 
cities > prefecture-level cities > county-level cities. This thesis focuses on cities at the 
prefecture level and above which is consistent with the literature. Since 1997, data for county-
level cities are reported differently to the rest, and they are not comparable.25 
 
                                               
22 There is the exception of autonomous regions in the far-flung regions of China, as well as different names being 
used such as counties and states. This holds true, however, for the rich coastal provinces of China. 
23 In practice, there is another measure in the City Yearbooks called “built-up area”, which most closely matches 
the usual definition of a city. However, the only data available for built-up areas are their land areas, and therefore 
it is not of much use here. 
24 See, for example, Xiang (2011). 
25 See, for example, City Yearbook 2016. 
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3.2 Cities in China, Then and Now 
Researchers have recognised several waves of urbanisation since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949. Although there is debate on the exact number of waves and the 
beginning and end of each, there is a consensus that China experienced under-urbanisation 
prior to 1978. Under the planned economy, the government’s emphasis was on heavy 
industries.26 Traditional urban centres such as those in the Yangtze River and Pearl River 
Deltas (PRD) were under-developed. Since the economic reforms, which started in 1978, 
however, big, commerce-oriented cities in those areas have regained pre-eminence in the 
Chinese economy (Naughton, 2007, pp. 128-129). Figure 4 shows a map of China with some 
major cities. 
 
China has seen rapid urbanisation since 1978. Three waves have been recognised in the 
literature as well as in the popular media. From 1978 to the late 1980s, China’s urbanisation 
was driven primarily by local urbanisation: peasants moved into local townships close to their 
home villages instead of moving into big cities, which are relatively far away. Town and village 
enterprises (TVEs) played an important role in this first wave. These enterprises enjoyed a 
variety of ownership structures, and worked in a variety of industries. Small to medium-sized 
cities had an increasing share of the urban population in China (Ye et al., 2006). 
 
The PRD is more open to the world and to the private sector than any other place on mainland 
China. Zhejiang, the province that is home to globally-minded Alibaba, has about 33,000 
foreign-invested firms, and Shanghai about 75,000, but Guangdong has over 110,000. In 
                                               
26 For the purpose of mobilizing resources for heavy industries, the Stalinist planned system was implemented in 
the Chinese economy. Naughton (2007, p. 55) labels this development strategy “big push industrialisation”. To 
generate and allocate resources for heavy industrial development, China relied on mechanisms such as investment 
licenses and import quotas rather than a price mechanism working through markets. 
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Liaoning, an industrial province in the north-east, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for 
about 31% of total industrial revenues, and in Shanghai for more than 36%, but in Guangdong 
the share is less than 14%. Moreover, the Delta alone generates nearly half of the mainland’s 
high-quality international patent filings, leading China in innovation.27 
 
The staggering growth of Shenzhen can be seen in a photograph taken from Hong Kong’s Crest 
Hill in 1964 (Panel (a) in Figure 5) and retaken in 2015 (Panel (b) in Figure 5). Between 1980 
and 2016 Shenzhen’s real GDP grew, on average, at 22% per annum and today stands at 2 
trillion yuan. The city’s Nanshan district, home to about 125 listed firms with a combined 
market value of nearly $400 billion, has a higher income per person than Hong Kong. Unlike 
Beijing, which has many top-tier universities, Shenzhen has only a handful of lacklustre 
institutions of higher learning. Having said that, so many graduates from all over China flock 
to the city that they make up a greater share of its population than do graduates in Beijing.28 It 
is a similar story for Shanghai. During 1978-2015, GDP per capita grew 14-fold.29 Similar 
before-and-after pictures taken across the Bund30 speak for the radical changes that have taken 
place, as shown in Figure 6. On a broader scale, China has been urbanising rapidly. During 
1978-2015, urban population increased from 172 to 771 million. 
  





29 http://tjj.sh.gov.cn/tjnj/nj16.htm?d1=2016tjnj/C0405.htm  
30 The Bund or wai’tan is a waterfront area in central Shanghai. 
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4. Data  
Data are collected mainly from three sources: (i) China City Statistical Yearbooks, (ii) China 
Population Yearbooks, and (iii) the website and various publications of the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, (NBS).31 The Yearbooks for each year report data for the previous year. For 
example, China City Statistical Yearbook 2016 reports data for 2015. I need data on real output, 
real capital stock, employment, human capital, and factor income shares to conduct my growth 
and development accounting exercises. Below I describe how I construct my dataset. 
 
In mainland China, there are currently 22 provinces, four centrally administered municipalities, 
and five autonomous regions. Because these entities have equivalent administrative status, the 
term “province” is utilised throughout this thesis. Chongqing, one of the largest cities in China, 
became a province-level city in 1997. Before that, it was a part of the province of Sichuan.32 
Data for Chongqing are taken directly from the City Yearbooks, without any adjustments.  
 
Name changes are frequent in the Yearbooks throughout the sample period. During 1994-2002, 
“total city” and “districts under city” were called di’qu: “regional”, and shi’qu: “urban” 
respectively. They were called quan’shi and shi’xia’qu between 2003 and 2015. Shi’qu and 
Shi’xia’qu are taken as equivalent, and I use data under these two columns without making any 
adjustments. Name changes for each variable, if any, are discussed in their respective chapters. 
Another issue is missing data. Should it arise, it is discussed in its respective chapter as well. 
                                               
31 The website contains China Statistical Yearbooks, output and price deflators at the province level, as well as 
urban population for the whole country since 1949. 
32 The State Council officially announced the territorial separation of Chongqing from the control of Sichuan 
province to establish the fourth province-level city of China on 18 June 1997 (Martinez and Cartier, 2017). 
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4.1 Sample and Sample Period 
As of 2015, there are 4 province-level, 15 vice-province-level, and 276 prefecture-level cities 
in mainland China. This makes a total of 295 cities at the prefecture level and above. Data 
unavailability makes it difficult to study all of them. My accounting exercises rely on data for 
output, capital stock, labour, human capital and income shares. Many cities do not have 
complete datasets. A ranking of cities by population, GDP or some other measures is arbitrary. 
It will also be plagued by definition issues such as hu’kou population versus resident, also 
known as de facto, population (see Appendix A.2 for more information on hu’kou). NBS 
started publishing housing price indices for 35 large and medium-sized cities (henceforth 35 
cities) in the fourth quarter of 1997. In July 2005 the sample was expanded to 70 large and 
medium-sized cities (henceforth 70 cities). The frequency of publication was also increased 
from quarterly to monthly.33 These 70 cities thus provide a consistent sample of cities free from 
arbitrary choices of my own. The city of Dali is dropped from the 70-city sample, as Dali is a 
county-level city, data for which are reported differently from those for cities at the prefecture 
level and above. It is common in the literature to limit the study of Chinese cities to those 35-
city or 70-city samples at the prefecture-level and above.34 In this thesis, the phrases “69 cities” 
and “70 cities” are used interchangeably. 
 
It is important to note that the 70 cities are not chosen arbitrarily. They are relevant since they 
include all province-level cities, provincial capitals,35 vice-province level cities, and all cities 
with independent budgetary status. These 70 cities are originally chosen by the NBS for 
tracking real estate prices. Nevertheless, a literature has developed regarding the economies of 
                                               
33 http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-06/30/content_323713.htm  
34 There are, however, some exceptions. For example, Alder et al. (2016) use a panel of 276 cities between 1988 
and 2010 and study the effect of place-based industrial policy on economic development, focusing on the 
establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in China. 
35 Excluding Lhasa, the provincial capital of Tibet. Output there is very small. 
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those cities. Researchers are not only interested in housing price movements, but have also 
studied human capital, land policy, effectiveness of maximum housing prices, and growth. 
 
Zhang et al. (2014) find a positive relationship between real estate investment and growth. The 
relationship is strongest in Eastern China. This is relevant to this thesis, as this part of China is 
where most of the 70 cities are located. Chen and Fu (2012) reach a slightly different but 
relevant finding. They find that in big cities the effect of real estate development on growth is 
relatively lower.36 Chen and Fu also argue that big cities rely more on human capital. This is 
in line with the findings on human capital in this thesis. The frontier city in this study, Shanghai, 
has one of the highest levels of human capital in the sample. Li (2004) ranks human capital in 
35 cities for 2001, and finds the top four to be Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. 
This is very promising as it reaffirms the first-tier status of these four cities. Haikou is second 
last, which corresponds to it having the lowest growth rate. 
 
Data availability determines the sample period in this thesis. The first year for which gross 
regional product, the city equivalent of GDP, is reported is 1994. The most recent City 
Yearbook reports data for 2015.37 Another issue is human capital. I estimate human capital 
using years of schooling found in population census reports. China has conducted a population 
census every decade since 1990, the most recent one being in 2010.38 Therefore, human capital 
series cover the years from 1990 to 2010. As a result, the sample period with human capital is 
1994-2010. When human capital is omitted from the production function, it can be extended to 
1994-2015. As human capital is an important factor input, I focus on the period of 1994-2010. 
                                               
36 The authors create their own categories for cities. Their “big cities” include Tier-1 cities and some large 
provincial capitals. 
37 See China City Statistical Yearbook 1995, 2016. 
38 Since its founding in 1949, China conducted population censuses in 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010. 
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The sample period is divided into four sub-periods: (i) 1994-2001, (ii) 2001-2007, (iii) 2007-
2009, and (iv) 2009-2010. The first period corresponds to China’s take-off in the 1990s. China 
joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001, and subsequently experienced 
an economic boom during 2001-2007. The 2007-2009 period was marked by the global 
financial crisis (GFC), while the period of 2009-2010 corresponds to the post-GFC era. 
 
4.2 Price Indices 
Output is reported at current price in the City Yearbooks, so it has to be deflated in order to 
produce real series.39 The NBS does not publish GDP deflators. Therefore, I obtain two price 
series with which to deflate nominal output. The first is a set of GDP deflators for all of China 
published by the World Bank.40 The drawback of the World Bank series is that it neglects 
regional variations in price levels. The second is a set of CPI series at the province level 
published on the NBS website.41 The drawback is that CPI does not completely substitute for 
GDP deflators. For both series the base year is set to 1994. 
 
Investment is also reported at current price in City Yearbooks. It has to be deflated in order to 
produce an estimate of the real capital stock. I use price indices for investment in fixed assets 
published by the NBS. This series is reported at the province level. Investment deflators suffer 
from missing data. The province of Guangdong is missing data for 1994-2000, the province of 
Hainan for 1994-1999, and Chongqing for 1994-1996. 42  I use national aggregates where 
provincial series are missing. Figure 7 plots the four series against each other and shows that 
the national series is a good match for the provincial ones, which justifies its use. 
                                               
39 In some years, the Yearbooks state explicitly that a variable is reported in current prices, in other years they 
don’t. I assume that everything in the Yearbooks are reported in current prices. 
40 They are available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG?locations=CN  
41 Available at http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103  
42 Chongqing was designated as one of the province-level cities in 1997. This change also altered its borders. 
Therefore, it is understandable why Chongqing is missing data prior to 1997. 
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4.3 Output 
Output series are available under the variable “gross regional product” in the City Yearbooks. 
Here I use gross regional product, GDP, and output interchangeably. The Chinese government 
places a huge emphasis on generating high output growth. Therefore, data on output are readily 
available. They are also believed to be relatively reliable.43 Furthermore, gross regional product 
is also the most consistent statistic over the years whose name does not change. Other variables 
such as employment and investment both have name changes over the period. 
 
As mentioned before, I deflate nominal output with both World Bank GDP deflators for all of 
China, and province-level CPI series published by the NBS. The two sets of real output are 
added up for all cities in the sample and plotted against each other, as shown in Figure 8. Both 
series exhibit exponential growth. They are almost identical up to 2004, and then start to 
diverge, with the provincial CPI-based output series being higher than the World Bank GDP 
deflator-based output series. Throughout this thesis, real output produced from provincial CPI 
series will be treated as my baseline results, as they reflect regional variation in price level 
which is significant in China. Additional results based on the real output deflated using World 
Bank GDP deflators are reported in Appendix A.7.  
 
Output also suffers from missing data. When data are missing, it is often the case that cities are 
missing data in the “districts under city” column, but have complete data in the corresponding 
“total city” column. Assuming that the two grow at similar rates, I fill in the missing 
observations by first calculating the growth rates of “total city” output, and then applying the 
                                               
43 Reliability of output data has come under scrutiny, however, in some parts of China after the GFC with several 
cases of inflated GDP figures. See, for example, https://qz.com/887709/chinas-liaoning-province-admitted-that-
it-inflated-gdp-figures-from-2011-to-2014/ This should not affect my results, however, as the years affected were 
2011 and later, and my sample period with human capital ends in 2010. 
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growth rates to the most recent “districts under city” figure.44 A special case is Ganzhou whose 
nominal output is missing for both “districts under city” and “total city” for 1998. The missing 
observation for 1998 is then interpolated using the fitted exponential curve. 
 
4.4 Capital Stock 
I employ the perpetual inventory method to estimate capital stock for each city: 
  =  + (1 − ).         (1) 
 
Three data series are required in order to proceed: real investment, depreciation rates, and initial 
capital stock. As mentioned before, the City Statistical Yearbooks report nominal investment 
series for each city, which I then deflate using price indices for investment in fixed assets 
published by the NBS at the province level. As per usual, all data are for districts under city. 
 
There are several problems concerning data collection and construction. One of these problems 
occurs because variable names are frequently changed. I use “gross fixed capital formation” 
for nominal investment. The specific name of the statistic has changed over the years. For 
1994-2005, it is called “investment in fixed assets”; for 2006-2011, “all society investment in 
fixed assets”; for 2012-2014, “all society investment in fixed assets (excluding rural 
households)”; for 2015, “investment in fixed assets (excluding rural households). It is 
important to note that in recent years investment data have moved towards an urban emphasis 
which is in line with the focus of this thesis. 
 
Missing observations are another concern. Changchun is missing data for “districts under city” 
for 2007-2008. The data are complete for the corresponding “total city” column. The missing 
                                               
44 As missing observations occur sporadically, and not for long periods of time, this assumption should hold. 
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data are filled in by linear interpolation. Ganzhou is missing both “districts under city” and 
“total city” data for 1997-1998. Again, I graph the series and fit an exponential curve, as the 
series clearly demonstrate exponential growth. The missing values are then interpolated. 
 
The most detailed work on capital stock at the city level in China is Xiang (2011). She studies 
all cities at the prefecture-level and above. Her sample period is 1995-2009. She covers all the 
cities which I am studying, and her sample period overlaps with mine. Both Xiang and I use 
“all society investment in fixed assets” to calculate real investment. Xiang reports depreciation 
rates at the province level for all provinces in mainland China for the entire period. I use her 
provincial depreciation rates for each city in its respective province. For example, Shenzhen is 
in the province of Guangdong and therefore I use Guangdong’s depreciation rates for Shenzhen. 
As my sample period is longer than the sample period of Xiang, I extend her depreciation rates 
at both ends. That is, for 1994 I use the numbers for 1995, and for 2010-2015 I use the numbers 
for 2011.  
 
One thing to note is that Xiang reports a panel of depreciation rates,  , with i being the 
province and t being the year. For the sake of simplicity, I calculate the average depreciation 
rate for each province,  after extending her panel. It is this average which I then use in my 
own calculations. Xiang actually reports two sets of depreciation rates, based on two different 
sets of assumptions about the useful life of capital stock. They serve as the upper and lower 
bound of the true depreciation rates. I choose the one that is closest to those reported in Bai et 
al. (2006), which is to say, roughly 10% per year. 
 
The last thing to do is to calculate initial capital stock  for each city. Here I use Xiang’s 
method again, which is taken from Reinsdorf and Cover (2005) whose proof I reproduce here. 
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Let  be real investment in year zero, that is, 1994. Assuming the average growth rate of real 
investment during the period could be extended backward in time, and calculated as  =
(  ⁄ ) ⁄ . In addition,  is the average depreciation rate over the period. Now I can 
calculate initial capital stock. If  is real investment in year zero, then real investment in year 
(-1) would be  
  =  !".                       (2a) 
 
The amount of that investment which survived into year zero, after taking away depreciation, 
would be  
  #$%& '& ($') 0 =  !(*)"  .                   (2b) 
 
Similarly, the amount of investment in year (-2) which remains in year zero, after taking into 
account investment growth and depreciation, would be 
 
 #$%& '& ($') 0 =   !(*)+(")+ .                    (2c) 
 
Initial capital stock is the sum of all previous investments, taking into account investment 
growth and depreciation: it is the sum to infinity of a geometric sequence, that is, 
 
 =  +  +  + ⋯ =  +  !(*)" +  !(*)+(")+ + ⋯ =  !-./-01 =
 !(")"* .                         (2d) 
There is one last thing to note. I have in fact simplified Xiang’s method and I explain my 
simplifications below. One of Xiang’s innovations is to introduce a three-year period for new 
investments to join productive capital stock. So, her capital stock equation is 
 = (1 − ) + 2 ( +  + ).                   (3a) 
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Xiang cites Ye (2002) for being the only study that considers a three-year period before 
investment is turned into capital stock. She also defines  
 3 = 2 ( +  + ).                     (3b) 
 
I adopt Xiang’s equation for capital stock. But for the sake of simplicity, I cut my sample off 
at 1994 while Xiang’s first year for 3 is 1997. Xiang calculates growth rate, , using 3 instead 
of , whereas I have used  for simplicity. My equations are as follows: 
  =  -445(")"* .                                 (4a) 
 = (1 − ) +  ( + ).                   (4b) 
6 = (1 − ) + 2 (6 +  + ).                             (4c) 
 
One can continue to calculate the capital stock for other years. Now, how do our series compare? 
I graph our real capital stock series for the four Tier-1 cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
and Shenzhen. As shown in each panel in Figure 9, they are reasonably close. Except for 
Shanghai, Xiang’s estimates are higher than my own.45 Lastly, some words on why I choose to 
adopt Xiang’s methodology. The reason I follow the methodology in Xiang (2011) is because 
hers is the only paper which deals extensively with capital stock at the city level in China. 
There are a lot of studies that calculate TFP at the national, provincial, or city level in China. 
They all contain estimates of capital stock. But none of them deals with city-level capital stock 
exclusively as their theme, and as a result their estimates of capital stock data are not as 
                                               
45 As Xiang’s sample period starts in 1995, my base year is also changed to 1995. Throughout this thesis, this is 
the only instance where the base year is changed. In all other cases, the base year is 1994. 
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thorough as that in Xiang (2011).46 Below I give a brief review of some studies in the literature, 
and point out where their treatment is not as extensive as Xiang’s. 
 
Mao and Pan (2012) study is the closest to Xiang (2011). However, they assume a common 
depreciation rate of 10.96% which is taken from Shan (2008). Furthermore, they calculate city-
level capital stock by multiplying province-level capital stock, for which data are more readily 
available, by the weight of the city’s GDP in its province. This is a strong assumption. Ke and 
Zhao (2014) study productivity at the city level in China, and talk briefly about capital stock at 
the city level. However, they also rely on strong assumptions. Firstly, they set an annual 
depreciation rate of 5%, which is only half the size of the more realistic estimate of 10%. 
Secondly, they use real investment, instead of investment in fixed assets, to calculate 
investment series. Ye (2002), as mentioned above, is the only study which talks about a three-
year period for investment in fixed assets to be transformed into capital stock. Ye’s study, 
however, focuses on productivity at the province level. Therefore, it is not as applicable as 
Xiang (2011). Other studies, such as Lin (2003), Zhang and Zhang (2003), Ren and Liu (1997), 
and Ye (2010b) all deal with capital stock at the national level (and Ye (2010a) talks about 
capital stock at the province level). 
 
4.5 Number of Workers 
Here I use employment to mean the number of workers: that is, the L term that is used to deflate 
aggregate variables Y and K into per-worker ones, y and k. Data for employment are the most 
difficult to obtain, as it is not reported directly in the Yearbooks. The various statistics that are 
reported suffered frequent name changes. I explain these issues below. There are two statistics 
                                               
46 The only journal paper (that I am aware of) that deals exclusively with capital stock at the city level in China is 
a paper written by Xiang and her supervisor, Prof. Ke Shanzi, published in 2012 (Ke and Xiang, 2012) based on 
Xiang (2011), which is her Master’s thesis. 
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reported in the City Yearbooks which are related to employment, both of which have undergone 
extensive name changes.47 The first is employment in work units,48 and the second is those 
working in privately-owned enterprises and the self-employed.  
 
As Table 1 shows, both measures have seen frequent name changes over the period. The exact 
names are not translated here, but the common elements are taken out and compared. It is 
evident that the two measures did not converge to an ideal state until recently. For example, 
judging by the names, adding the two variables would have produced a reasonably accurate 
number for total employment in “districts under city” for 2015. For earlier years, however, this 
would be questionable. 
 
The first attempt at calculating total urban employment produces dramatically underestimated 
figures, as I simply use the left-hand column in Table 1. Doing so completely distorts the 
ranking of cities in terms of income (i.e., output per worker) levels. Relatively undeveloped 
cities, such as Shijiazhuang, rise to the top, while rich ones, such as Xiamen, sink to the bottom. 
The second attempt is to add together the left and right-hand columns. Indeed, this is what is 
sometimes done in the literature (See, for example, Xiang, 2011). This particular method is 
actually not good enough, as I go down the same path, and discover that adding the two 
columns does not produce satisfactory employment series, either. 49  For some cities, 
employment thus produced is too high, while for others it is too low. 
                                               
47 The City Yearbooks are the only sources which report employment at the city level. 
48 The work unit—known as dan’wei in Mandarin—used to be an important aspect of life in urban China. A work 
unit is a workplace. Under the planned economy, all enterprises, factories, schools, public institutes, and 
government agencies, etc. were known as work units. Although the term dan’wei is used mainly in cities, 
communes and collective farms in rural China were also treated as work units. After 1978, however, and especially 
since the 1990s when private enterprises blossomed in China, the employment share of work units have declined 
significantly. Nowadays the term “work unit” exclusively refers to the entities outside the private economy. In 
casual conversations people sometimes still refer to their firm as their work unit, but in statistical publications, 
including the City Yearbooks, work units or units refer exclusively to non-private enterprises. 
49 The two employment variables also suffer from missing data. If only “districts under city” are missing, it is 
filled in using growth rates of the corresponding “total city” column. I interpolate the data for those cities that are 
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For example, in 2015, this approach yields 18 million workers for Beijing, which has a 
population of 22 million. Shijiazhuang, with over 10 million residents, has less than 1 million 
workers in 2015, according to a simple addition of the two columns. This is obviously not true, 
and using these inaccurate employment figures distorts the income distribution. Shijiazhuang 
becomes one of the richest cities in China, while cities like Shanghai, Beijing, and Xiamen are 
among the poorest. The last straw is a definition change introduced by the NBS in 1997. There 
is a huge decline from 1997 to 1998. The NBS explains that, prior to the change, employment 
in rural areas is included, after 1997 it is excluded. Although the change is in line with the 
urban focus of this thesis, such drastic definition changes and the lack of other reliable data 
sources on city-level employment render the employment figures in City Yearbooks unusable.50 
I estimate city-level employment for this thesis 789:; using the following formula: 
 89: = <=>?@ ABACD?B@ EB= FG <=>?@ ABACD?B@ EB= HIBDJ FBC@=G  × L)M'N $OP#Q(O$N& %Q) RℎQ#$ TQUN&)(.   (5) 
 
Essentially, faced with a lack of city-level employment data, it has to be estimated using 
national-level data. Here the assumption is that the weight of a city’s urban population in 
China’s total urban population is equal to its percentage of employment. Admittedly, this is 
somewhat restrictive. The China Statistical Yearbooks, available on the NBS website, report 
consistent urban employment series for the whole country. 51  A consistent set of urban 
population data for the whole country can be found in the China Population and Employment 
Statistics Yearbooks.52 Urban population figures for each city, however, are difficult to obtain. 
                                               
missing both columns. Interpolation is done linearly except Ganzhou, where I fit an exponential curve, as linear 
interpolation would have produced negative values. 
50 Province-level cities have their own statistical bureaus and publish their own Yearbooks. These Yearbooks often 
report resident population going back to 1978. For the sake of consistency, however, these sources are not used. 
51 See Table 4-2 of China Statistical Yearbook 2016. The figures are confirmed by Table 5 of China Compendium 
of Statistics 1949-2013, under “total number of employed persons—urban area”. The later, however, as its name 
suggests, only contains data up to 2013. 
52 See Table 1-4 of China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook 2016. 
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This is in large part due to the hu’kou system. Essentially, it is an internal passport issued at 
birth. Hu’kou information is registered with the police and is readily available. End-of-year 
local hu’kou population are reported in the City Yearbooks, and these are the series I use to 
represent urban population in each city.53 This introduces a bias, however, as the number of 
local hu’kou holders in an area can be hugely different from the number of residents in that 
place, as people migrate. This differential can be especially large in coastal areas, where the 
prospect of finding better jobs has drawn millions of workers from inland China. 
 
For rich cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen which attract workers from elsewhere in China, 
resident population is significantly larger than local hu’kou population. At the end of 2015, the 
local hu’kou population in Shanghai was 14 million, while the resident population was 24 
million. In Shenzhen, the local hu’kou population was 3.5 million at the end of 2015, but the 
resident population was over 11 million. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that 
differences in output levels are exaggerated, since employment in rich cities, according to this 
method, are underestimated. Output per worker (labour productivity) produced using my own 
estimates of urban employment are consistent with economic facts on the ground. Tier-1 cities 
are among the most productive in China, while Tier-3 cities are amongst the poorest. This lends 
support to my method.54 
 
4.6 Human Capital 
It is very important to consider human capital. Otherwise I will be treating all workers as 
undifferentiated raw labour with the same level of productivity. But this is obviously not true. 
Workers have different levels of educational attainment, for example, and therefore different 
                                               
53 As per usual, I have used data under the column “districts under city”. 
54 Appendix A.4 provides another set of employment data using the County-Level Population Census Reports. I 
compare residential population series with hu’kou series. The two series are close for all cities except Shenzhen, 
which is an outlier. Nevertheless, the qualitative nature of my results does not change when Shenzhen is dropped. 
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levels of productivity. For the sake of simplicity and data availability, I use average years of 
schooling to construct human capital. The only sources that contain average years of schooling 
at the city level are the county-level population census reports.55 Average years of schooling 
are reported directly for 2000 and 2010.56 However, they are not reported directly for 1990 and 
have to be estimated.57 In all three cases I focus on population aged six and above (V6). For 
1990, the formula I use is: 
 V6 = ∗X!∗X-Y∗X+.∗(XZX5)∗(X[X\)]BA .                                          (6a) 
 
Here V denotes no schooling, V  primary school, V secondary school, V2 high school, V 
specialised secondary school (zhong’zhuan), V junior college (da’zhuan), V6 undergraduate, 
and :QP denotes population aged six and above.58 In order to keep my numbers consistent, I 
estimate average years of schooling for 2000 and 2010 as well. In other words, I use my own 
calculations for average years of schooling throughout this thesis. I use the following formula 
to calculate average years of schooling for population aged 6 and above for 2000 (V6 ): 
 V6 = ∗(X!X-)∗X+Y∗XZ.∗(X5X[)∗(X\X^)6∗X_]BA .                              (6b)  
 
Here V  denotes no schooling, V  literacy class (sao’mang’ban), V  primary school, V2 
secondary school, V high school, V specialised secondary school (zhong’zhuan), V6 junior 
                                               
55 Not to be confused with county-level cities. In China, all cities are further divided into districts and counties 
which total over two thousand in number. County-level reports simply means that these reports are collected from 
all the districts and counties from all cities in China. As a result, they are very rich in detail. 
56 Data for 2000 are available online at 
 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkoupucha/2000fenxian/htm/table4.htm. Data for 2010 are purchased 
separately. For both years, I use the statistic “Average years of schooling for population aged 6 and above” found 
in Table 4. 
57 Data for 1990 are found in Table 3-1 of China Population Yearbook 2000. I use the formula in Qian and Smyth 
(2006). I make changes to the formula, combining specialised secondary school and high school as well as college 
and university. 
58 Note that V + V +…+ V6 should be equal to :QP. However, this is not always the case for 1990. Several 
cities had minor discrepancies. These cities, however, are all Tier-3 ones, and the discrepancies, if any, are small, 
of the order of several tens or hundreds. 
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college (da’zhuan), V` undergraduate, VY postgraduate, and :QP denotes population aged six 
and above.59 
 
Finally, I use the following formula to calculate average years of schooling for population aged 
6 and above for the year 2010 (V6 ): 
 V6 = ∗X!∗X-Y∗X+.∗XZ∗(X5X[)]BA  .                                         (6c) 
 
Here V denotes no schooling, V primary school, V secondary school, V2 high school, V 
junior college (da’zhuan), V undergraduate and above. Note that there are two changes in 
2010. First, there is no separate category for literacy class.60 Second, there are no separate 
categories for specialised secondary school or postgraduate, either. Rather, undergraduate and 
postgraduate studies are combined in V. I assign 14 years to both of them. 
 
Levels of educational attainment reported for 2000 are different than those reported for 1990. 
As a result, some further adjustments are made. No schooling and literacy class are pulled 
together. I assign 16 years to those with postgraduate degrees. As population censuses are 
carried out once every decade in China, data are missing for the years in between. They are 
filled in by interpolation.61 Then I use the following function to construct human capital: 
 ℎ = $a(b),              (7) 
where c is average years of schooling, and d(c) is a function of s. Hsieh and Klenow (2010) 
use d(c) = 0.085c, that is, the return to one extra year of education is constant at 8.5%. It is 
                                               
59 For 2000, total population aged 6 and above is not reported, so I simply take the sum from V to VY. As a result, 
there is no discrepancy issue. 
60 This is not surprising. As literacy rate in mainland China continues to increase, literacy classes have faded in 
importance. 
61 I interpolate linearly during 1990-2000 and 2000-2010 using the spline function in MATLAB. 
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important to note that Hsieh and Klenow (2010) focus on productivity differences across 
countries, and do not pay any particular attention to China. I use the linear piecewise function 
following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) for d(c) . The slopes are taken from 
Psacharopoulos (1994) and measure returns to education for the whole world. The function in 
Caselli (2005) is as follows: 
 
φ(s) = h0.134c,                                                             c ≤ 40.134 ∗ 4 + 0.101(c − 4),                  4 < c ≤ 80.134 ∗ 4 + 0.101 ∗ 4 + 0.068(c − 8), c > 8.                 (8a) 
 
The shortcoming of this function is that the slopes represent returns to education for the whole 
world. The return for the first four years of schooling is 13.4%, for the next four is 10.1% and 
for all the years above eight the return is 6.8%.62 Ideally, returns specific to China are needed. 
Peng (2011), to the best of my knowledge, is the only study which specifically focuses on the 
returns to education in China at the city level. Peng reports two sets of results. First, he reports 
average returns to schooling for province-level cities, provincial capitals, and other cities63 
Next, Peng breaks down educational attainment into three categories in order to study the 
returns to different levels of schooling: (i) “secondary school and below”, (ii) “high school or 
specialised secondary school (zhong’zhuan)”, and (iii) “junior college (da’zhuan) and above”.  
 
Table 2 reports Peng’s returns to schooling, which are specific to China. Note that Peng finds 
increasing returns to education in China. This contrasts with decreasing returns discussed in 
Caselli (2005). Peng also finds higher returns to education in province-level cities than 
provincial capitals, which in turn have higher returns than other cities. Lastly, I make 
adjustments to Peng’s method. Peng categorises cities as province-level cities, provincial 
                                               
62 The measures are not country specific and, therefore, do not control for the quality of education in each country. 
63 Peng makes adjustments to his sample, and the cities in each group do not correspond strictly with their official 
designations. 
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capitals, and other cities, and I relabel them as Tier-1, 2, and 3 cities. I apply the same years of 
schooling as found in Qian and Smyth (2006), that is, 8 years for secondary school, and 10.5 
years for high school. Thus, I combine Qian and Smyth (2006) and Peng (2011) to come up 
with functions for human capital for cities in different tiers: 
 
Tier-1 cities: 
φ(s) = h 0.041c,                                                                           c ≤ 80.041 ∗ 8 + 0.073(c − 8),                          8 < c ≤ 10.5 0.041 ∗ 8 + 0.073 ∗ 2.5 + 0.141(c − 10.5), c > 10.5.     (8b)             
 
Tier-2 cities: 
φ(s) = h 0.029c,                                                                           c ≤ 80.029 ∗ 8 + 0.086(c − 8),                          8 < c ≤ 10.5 0.029 ∗ 8 + 0.086 ∗ 2.5 + 0.116(c − 10.5), c > 10.5.     (8c)             
 
Tier-3 cities: 
φ(s) = h 0.043c,                                                                           c ≤ 80.043 ∗ 8 + 0.074(c − 8),                          8 < c ≤ 10.5 0.043 ∗ 8 + 0.074 ∗ 2.5 + 0.115(c − 10.5), c > 10.5.     (8d)             
 
Appendix A.5 provides some more discussion of human capital. 
 
4.7 Factor Income Shares 
Kaldor’s stylised facts are well-known in the literature. Kaldor (1961) finds that, among other 
things, factor income shares are stable over long time periods. Gollin (2002) argues that the 
naïve labour share, calculated as the ratio of labour income to GDP, underestimates the value 
for developing countries. The adjusted labour share, however, is remarkably stable across time 
and space, and clusters around two-thirds. In line with Gollin (2002), Bernanke and Gürkaynak 
(2001) find no systematic covariation between a country’s labour share of income and income 
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per capita. They also find labour’s share of income within each country to be stable over time. 
Setting a common value of two-thirds as labour’s share of income for each country has become 
a widely used practice in cross-country studies since then. 
 
Recently, it has been proposed that labour’s share of income might differ between developed 
and developing countries. For example, Izyumov and Vahaly (2015) contradict the factor 
income share convergence hypothesis for the 1990-2008 period (using a group of 55 developed 
and developing countries). They argue that developing countries have lower labour income 
shares than developed ones. Chen et al. (2010) use one-half as the labour income share in 
developing countries. Trapp (2015) discusses the challenges of measuring labour’s income 
share in developing countries, studying developing countries from 1990 to 2011. She argues 
that the average level of labour’s income share is around 0.47. 
 
What about China? Fang (2011) provides a brief literature review on labour’s income share in 
China. It is re-iterated here. Li (1992) finds that labour share in China increases after the 
reforms in 1978, and levels-off after 1990. During 1955-1990, its value is between 0.5 and 0.75. 
Labour share declines in the 1990s. Li and Yin (2007) share the same finding. Luo and Zhang 
(2009) find that naïve labour share peaks at 0.51 in 1995 and declines to 0.42 in 2004. Yang 
and Shao (2009) reach a similar finding: during 1997-2006, naïve labour share falls from 0.53 
to 0.42. The consensus in the literature is that labour share in China was low under the planned 
economy. It increased after 1978, peaking in the early 1990s and has declined since. Note that 
the emphasis in the literature is to explain why labour share has been changing, rather than to 
calculate it. Also note it is often the naïve share that is quoted, and that adjusted labour share 
would have been more stable. Variation over time notwithstanding, 0.5 is a good approximation 
for the purposes of growth and development accounting. 
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Due to data unavailability it is difficult to calculate the labour share of income at the city level. 
The most relevant statistic reported in the City Yearbooks, “total wage bill of employed staff 
and workers”, is not the same as “compensation of employees” reported on the NBS website. 
It is significantly lower. One possible explanation is that it includes only those employed in 
work units, as the word used for staff and workers, zhi’gong, implies employment in the public 
sector. Therefore, I use the provincial labour shares. Chi and Qian (2013) argue that, when 
indirect taxes are an important source of government revenue, the adjusted labour share should 
be adopted over the naïve one. Since this is indeed the case in China, adjusted labour shares 
are reported here. The formula for naive labour share is: 
 q'rs$ #'MQU) cℎ')$ = tBuAJ@b?B@ BE JuADBGJJbvw] × 100%.                                                   (9a) 
 
There are a lot of different ways to adjust naïve labour share. Gollin (2002) discusses three 
different methods, while Young (1995) takes into account sex, age, and education when 
calculating the labour share for Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea. Such detailed 
microdata are not available for the cities and periods covered in this thesis.64 At the province 
level, output is broken down into compensation of employees, net taxes on production, 
depreciation of fixed assets, and operating surplus. Therefore, naïve labour share is adjusted 
by subtracting indirect taxes (taxes on production) from output. The formula for adjusted labour 
share is, therefore: 
 yz{Uc&$z #'MQU) cℎ')$ = tBuAJ@b?B@ BE JuADBGJJbvw] @|=JF ?}Jb × 100%.                           (9b) 
 
Table 3 (4) reports the naïve (adjusted) labour shares for 31 provinces in selected years between 
1994 and 2015. The reported figures are close to 0.5. The average of averages for all provinces 
                                               
64 The most detailed breakdown of output at the province level is found on the NBS website under “Regional—
Annual by province—Gross Regional Product by income approach.” 
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is 0.49 for naïve labour share and 0.57 for adjusted labour share. Both naïve and adjusted labour 
shares have small standard deviations, so they are relatively stable over time. Labour share is 
also relatively stable across provinces, with the naïve labour share being around 0.5 and the 
adjusted labour share being 0.6. This is in line with the finding in Gollin (2002) that adjusting 
naïve labour share by taxes reduces cross-country variation. The stability of labour’s share in 
national income is relevant to this thesis, as it enables development accounting to be carried 
out. Development accounting with the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function requires 
that factor income shares be constant over time. Sturgill (2014) shows that development 
accounting with the Cobb–Douglas aggregate production function is invalid without the 




5. Accounting Exercises 
5.1 Growth Accounting 
The objective in growth accounting is to estimate the contributions of technological progress 
and factor accumulation to differences in growth rates of output. The question I ask is: How 
much of the growth of output per worker of the individual Chinese cities can be attributed to 
capital deepening (physical capital per worker and human capital per worker) and how much 
is due to growth in TFP? Here I present a decomposition of growth in output per worker in 
terms of the capital-labour ratio. Appendix A.6.1 presents a decomposition of growth in output 
per worker in terms of the capital-output ratio.  
 
I adopt a Cobb-Douglas production function, according to which a city’s GDP is: 
 Y = A(ℎ),                  (10a) 
 
where   denotes real output,   denotes capital stock, h denotes human capital, L denotes 
number of workers,  denotes capital’s income share, and A denotes TFP. In per worker terms, 
Equation (10a) becomes 
 y = Aℎ,                              (10b) 
where y represents output per worker (Y/L), with k representing the capital-labour ratio (K/L). 
Taking logarithms of the terms in Equation (10b) and decomposing the average annual growth 
rate of output per worker over “z” years (from time t to time t+z) yields: 
 D@(G0)D@ ( G) = (0)D@()  +  (0) ()  + (1- ) (I0)D@(I) .                             (11) 
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This equation breaks down changes in output per worker into three components: changes in 
TFP, changes in physical capital per worker, and changes in human capital per worker. In terms 
of growth rates, Equation (11) can be restated as  
G =  +  + (1 − )I,        (12) 
where } denotes the growth rate of factor x, and so on, etc. More specifically, over a period 
of z years, the annual growth rate of y is approximated by 
G ≈ D@(G0)D@ ( G)                       (13) 
From (12), the contribution of growth in TFP to growth in output per worker is 
"" , the 
contribution of growth in capital per worker is  "", and the contribution of growth in human 
capital per worker is (1 − ) "".  
 
5.2 Development Accounting 
Whereas growth accounting focuses on growth rates, development accounting focuses on 
levels. It is also known as levels accounting. The objective in levels accounting is to apportion 
differences in income levels to differences in TFP levels and factor inputs. Here I ask if city A 
is richer than city B, is it because city A has more capital, more labour, more human capital, or 
higher TFP? In per worker terms, the question becomes: if workers in city A are more 
productive than those in city B, is it because workers in city A have more capital per worker, 
are better educated on average, or are better at using their physical and human capital? 
 
Hanushek et al. (2017) conduct a development accounting exercise for different states in the 
US in order to determine the potential gains from improving school quality. They argue that 
development accounting is more appropriate for determining income differences between 
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regions in the same country, than for income differences across countries. The key reason is 
that regions within a country are more likely to operate under the same production function. In 
the same spirit, I conduct a development accounting exercise for the 69 Chinese cities in my 
sample. 
 
In a development accounting exercise, I have a cross-section of cities, and perform the 
decomposition of the level of GDP per worker into factor inputs (such as physical and human 
capital) and TFP to answer questions such as: How much of the variation in output per worker 
among the major cities in China is explained by productivity differences or differences in factor 
inputs? 
 
Caselli (2005) rewrites Equation (10b) as 
 y = A(X,                     (14) 
 
where (X = ℎ . Caselli names (X  the factor-only model. The key question he 
addresses is: what will the world income distribution be if all countries had the same level of 
efficiency?65 The only difference is that here I am focusing on cities in China. Next, Caselli 
expresses the variance of #N(() using (14): 
 Varln(y) = Varln(A) + Varln((X) + 2Qsln(y) , ln((X).               (15) 
 
The key issue is how much of the variation in income levels can be explained by factor 
endowments, that is, the factor-only model. The more successful the factor-only model is at 
explaining variation in income levels, the smaller the role of TFP in determining differences in 
                                               
65 Caselli’s method is also taken up by Arezki and Cherif (2010). 
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output per worker across cities, and vice versa. Caselli proposes two measures of success for 
the factor-only model. The first measure is this: 
 
cUTT$cc = (G)() .                                                    (16a) 
 
If all cities had the same level of efficiency, then the variance of #N(y) and the covariance 
between #N(y) and #N((X) are both zero, and cUTT$cc would be equal to 1. Intuitively, (16a) 
shows how much of the variation in income levels, as measured by the variance of #N((), can 
be explained by variation in factor endowments, as measured by the variance of #N((X). In a 
counterfactual world where all cities had the same level of efficiency, all income differences 
must be due to rich cities having more physical and/or human capital and poor cities having 
less. 
 
I also implement the second measure of success of Caselli (2005), which is cUTT$cc: 
 
cUTT$cc = G4! G-! G4! G-!⁄ .                               (16b) 
 
In (16b), (X  indicates the 90th percentile of (X, and (X  the 10th percentile, and so on, etc. 
The most straightforward way to calculate “variation” in a variable is simply to take the ratio 
between the highest value and the lowest. Furthermore, in using the 90th and 10th percentiles, 
Equation (16b) avoids the potential distortion caused by outliers. The highest and lowest values 
are omitted. Therefore, it asks how much of the variation in income levels, as measured by a 
simple ratio between the 90th and 10th percentile, can be explained by variation in factor 
endowments. There is a third measure of success proposed by Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare 
(1997), which is called cUTT$cc2: 
 
cUTT$cc2 = ¡?=((G))tB¢((),(G))¡?=((G)) .                                                                        (16c) 
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Now there is a covariance term in the numerator. Note that the co-efficient of the covariance 
term is one instead of two as found in Equation (15). This implies that, in words of Caselli, 
“the contribution from the covariance term is split evenly between A and (X.” In essence, 
cUTT$cc2 attributes that part of the variation in A that covaries with (X also to the factor only 
model. The trade-off is that it imposes a somewhat restrictive assumption on the covariance 
term.  
 
Before moving to the results of these analyses, it is important to understand the role and scope 
of growth and development accounting exercises. As Caselli (2005) puts it, they should be 
recognised as diagnostic tools. In addition, these exercises are useful since there are significant 
methodological debates regarding the growth regression approach. Specifically, cross-country 
(growth) regressions are subject to concerns about possible endogeneity biases due to omitted 
variables and reverse causality. However, growth and development accounting exercises do 
not depend on estimating the parameters since they take them from the microeconomic 
literature and derives the structure in the macroeconomic analysis by assuming a particular 








                                               
66 They also do not require TFP to be orthogonal to factor inputs. By applying externally estimated production 
parameters to variations in a country’s economic inputs the analysis avoids the concern of endogeneity (Hanushek 
and Woessmann, 2012). 
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6. Results  
Here I present the results for both accounting exercises. Note that, in order to see the effect of 
different labour shares, I try three different values for : 0.5, 0.65, and 0.33. My baseline 
specification is  = 0.5 as it is the closest to the actual labour income share among Chinese 
cities, as shown in Chapter 4.7. Below I report only my baseline results. The rest are reported 
in the corresponding appendices. 
 
6.1 Results for Growth Accounting 
Here I present the results for growth accounting when I express output per worker in terms of 
the capital-labour ratio, where output is deflated using provincial CPI and  is 0.5. Appendix 
A.7 provides additional results for different values of . Appendix A.8 presents the results for 
growth accounting when I express output per worker in terms of the capital-output ratio. 
 
6.1.1 Growth Accounting in Terms of the Capital-Labour Ratio 
The results for each city are presented in Table 5. When looking at Tiers 1, 2, and 3 cities, it is 
obvious that Tier-1 cities make a group of their own. TFP growth accounts for more than 50% 
of output per worker growth between 1994 and 2010 in each first-tier city.67 The highest 
contribution rate in Tier-2 cities is lower than the lowest in Tier-1. TFP contributions in Tier-
2 and 3 cities overlap, with Tier-3 cities being more spread-out. These findings indicate that 
while the 70 cities altogether represent the economic frontier of all cities in China, the first-tier 
cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen) represent the very top of the 70. Their 
high TFP contributions reaffirm the Tier-1 classification given to them by the NBS. Another 
finding is that the contribution of human capital is relatively small. This is expected, as human 
                                               
67 The finding that TFP contribution is the highest in Tier-1 cities holds true when  is 0.33 or 0.65, as well as 
when World Bank GDP deflators are used (See Table A3 and Table A4 in Appendix A.7). 
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capital is calculated from average years of schooling, which grows at roughly 1 extra year every 
decade regardless of its initial level. Therefore, growth rates in human capital are almost 
uniform across cities. 
 
I now turn to specific cities, as well as sub-periods. The first city is the frontier city, Shanghai. 
During 1994-2010, output per worker grew at an average rate of 10.19% per year in Shanghai. 
In terms of sub-periods, during 1994-2001, it grew at 9.20% per year. This increased to 12.80% 
during 2001-2007. Remarkably, even during the GFC of the 2007-2009 period, output per 
worker grew at 6.41%. The corresponding growth rate was very close to 9% in the post-crisis 
recovery period of 2009-2010. Two events took place in the first two sub-periods. The first is 
Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, after which reforms picked up pace. This tour was the 
most dramatic political incident to occur between the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989 and 
the Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992 (Zhao, 1993). This paved the way for rapid 
economic growth in the 1990s in which TFP understandably played a significant role. The 
second is China joining the WTO in December 2001. The spectacular growth during 2001-
2007 was caused by rapid export growth and reforms after entry into WTO. In the post-crisis 
recovery period, TFP’s contribution went up to 56.6%. This could be explained partially by the 
World Expo which took place in Shanghai in 2010. The other reason is reform. After the 
financial crisis, the Chinese government put a heavy emphasis on services which tended to 
absorb more employment. Shanghai is also designated as the financial centre on mainland 
China.68 All of these reform efforts have helped to explain the revival in TFP contribution after 
2009. 
 
                                               
68 See http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/9218435.html for more information. 
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The experiences of the other Tier-1 cities are similar. Growth hit historical highs during 2001-
2007, followed by a slow-down during the GFC. TFP contributions were high throughout the 
period, falling during 2007-2009, and rebounding during 2009-2010. The only exception is 
Shenzhen, whose output per worker fell by 0.13% each year during 2007-2009. TFP in 
Shenzhen fell during the period, with a growth rate of -1.29% per year. A probable reason for 
Shenzhen is that it is an export-oriented city, and the GFC started as the subprime mortgage 
crisis in the U.S., which affected China via a collapse in export demand, among other channels. 
As a result, Shenzhen, and in fact the entire PRD, was hit hard.69 
 
Next, I turn to those cities that have had negative TFP contributions during the period. Growth 
potential in cities with negative TFP contributions is questionable, as capital inevitably runs 
into diminishing returns and human capital’s role (based on educational attainment) has been 
found to be small. The most noteworthy city is Chongqing, China’s largest city by population. 
During 1994-2010 TFP fell by 0.51% per year. This is alarming, especially considering that 
Chongqing is not a rich city. Chongqing’s story is one of massive investments in capital.70 
Gross fixed capital formation was less than 40% of output in 2001, and increased to nearly 100% 
in 2016. Post GFC, the local government in Chongqing has resorted to huge infrastructure 
spending in order to pump up growth. Investment in infrastructure increased by 30% in 2009.71 
Output per worker achieved a stunning growth rate of 22.39% per annum during 2007-2009, 
but fell to 14.49% during 2009-2010. TFP and capital contributed roughly half each during 
2007-2009, but the contribution of TFP fell to 18.8% during 2009-2010. In addition, massive 
                                               
69 See http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2009-05/11/content_17758919.htm for more information on the GFC’s 
effect on the PRD. 
70 The mayor denies that Chongqing suffers from over-investment. See, for example,  
http://www.china.com.cn/lianghui/news/2017-03/07/content_40420764.htm. 
71 See http://www.sohu.com/a/149360319_619343.  
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infrastructure projects, while helping to mitigate the effects of the GFC, resulted in inefficiency 
later on. 
 
Another noteworthy city is Nanjing, because its TFP grew, on average, by -0.04% during 1994-
2010. Nanjing has had a typical growth experience during this period, growing at a rate of 7.02% 
during 1994-2001, which rose to 10.36% during 2001-2007, and fell to 7.81% during 2007-
2009, and finally rebounded to 12.14% during 2009-2010. However, TFP growth tells a 
different story. TFP grew, on average, by -1.44% during 1994-2001, and remained low 
throughout the period. Nanjing’s growth was driven overwhelmingly by capital deepening, 
with growth in capital per worker contributed 85.5% to output growth during 2001-2007, and 
91.6% during 2007-2009. After taking away roughly five percentage points from growth in 
human capital, this leaves hardly any contribution from TFP. Some insights from economic 
geography may help to understand Nanjing’s situation. Nanjing is located too far from 
Shanghai to benefit from agglomeration economics, but too close to draw resources to itself. 
In other words, Shanghai has “stolen” Nanjing’s fortunes. This is an interesting hypothesis. 
Indeed, Jinhua, a city in southern Zhejiang province, located about the same distance from 
Shanghai as Nanjing, also has negative TFP contributions during the period, at -3.2%. On the 
other hand, cities closer to Shanghai experience positive, albeit lower, TFP growth rates and 
contributions. Cities in this category include Hangzhou, where TFP contributes 3.9% to growth, 
and Ningbo, a port city south of Shanghai, where TFP contributes 31.9%. Dandong stands out 
for having negative TFP contributions. At -19.1%, this is the lowest among the 69 major cities. 
In terms of growth rates, TFP declines by 1.36% per annum during the period. Dandong is a 
border town between China and North Korea.72  
                                               
72 The border between the two countries stretches over 1400 kilometers. Dandong is the largest city along the 
border. 
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Other cities that suffer from over-investment in capital and negative TFP contributions include 
Xuzhou, an old industrial town in northern Jiangsu province which is too far from Shanghai, 
or the Yangtze River Delta for that matter, to benefit from agglomeration economics. Another 
city is Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan, whose government has focused on 
investment growth in order to achieve high output growth. Unlike Chongqing, investment in 
Kunming comes mostly from real estate development. Lastly, there is Nanchong, a city located 
in far-flung regions of landlocked Sichuan. By every metric, Nanchong comes out last in the 
sample. Policymakers need to recognise Nanchong’s geographical constraints and pursue 
policies that are cost-effective for that left-behind city. 
 
6.1.2 Tier-1, 2, 3 Cities and All 69 Cities 
 
Here I investigate TFP performance for Tier-1, 2, and 3 cities, as well as all 69 cities in the 
sample. When aggregating the variables, output, labour, and capital are added up. Human 
capital is weighted using: 
 human capital for groupings = I-­-I+­+⋯I®­®­-­+⋯­® .                                                   (17) 
 
Table 6 presents the results of growth accounting for each tier as well as the 69-city aggregate. 
Taken as a whole, the 69 cities have done reasonably well over the period. For example, TFP 
growth contributed over 40% to output per worker growth during the 1994-2001 and the 2001-
2007 periods and accounted for 27.3% of output per worker growth in the post-GFC recovery 
period. That being said, one has to keep in mind that the 69 cities are biased towards Tier-1 
and 2 cities. TFP contribution for the 69 is pull up by Tier-1 cities, which I examine below. 
 
TFP contribution in Tier-1 cities was already high during 1994-2001, at 59.2%. It increased to 
61% during 2001-2007 which is a period of economic boom for China. During the GFC it went 
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down to 34.9%. Finally, in the post-crisis recovery period, TFP contribution went back up to 
54.9%. This pattern is found in many cities in the sample. Tier-1 cities are the only group with 
high TFP contributions. TFP contributions in both Tier-2 and 3 cities are much lower. Tier-3 
cities at least had a similar TFP pattern to Tier-1 cities, peaking during 2001-2007, declining 
during the GFC, and rebounding afterwards. Tier-2 cities are worrisome in that their TFP 
contributions during the post-crisis recovery period is actually the lowest among all sub-periods. 
This suggests that Tier-2 cities have relied heavily on capital deepening in order to recover 
from the GFC. 
 
Tier-3 cities are slightly better than Tier-2 cities in that their growth has depended more on 
TFP during the period, and thus as theory predicts, is more sustainable. Nevertheless, TFP 
contribution in Tier-3 cities never exceeds 40% in any of the sub-periods. Considering that 
Tier-3 cities are generally poorer than Tier-1 and 2 cities, their low TFP contribution is 
worrisome. It indicates that poor cities are relying on capital deepening to drive growth, which 
is unsustainable. 
 
6.2 Results for Development Accounting 
6.2.1 Importance of TFP Differences 
I present the results for development accounting when I express output per worker in terms of 
the capital-labour ratio. Appendix A.9 presents the corresponding results when I express output 
per worker in terms of the capital-output ratio. When output per worker is decomposed in terms 
of capital-labour ratio, we are asking the question: what would the counterfactual distribution 
of income levels be if all cities had the same level of efficiency? I first present results for all 
69 cities, and then analyse Tier-1, 2 and 3 cities separately. 
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Panel (a) in Figure 10 shows the evolution of all three success measures for the 1994-2010 
period when nominal output is deflated using provincial CPI series and labour’s income share 
is 0.5. As shown, all three measures of success have been declining over time. This points to 
the increasing role of TFP differences in explaining output per worker differences across cities 
in China. Panel (b) in Figure 10 shows that switching to the World Bank’s GDP deflators does 
not change the qualitative nature of the results. It is interesting to note that, depending on the 
series chosen, the explanatory power of the factor-only model reaches its lowest level around 
2004, and then increases. This is true whether nominal output is deflated using CPI or GDP 
deflator series. This shows that the role of TFP differences in accounting for the differences in 
output per worker levels actually did not increase between 2004 and 2010.  
 
6.2.2 Level Variables Relative to Shanghai 
 
I can express output per worker in city i relative to city j as follows: 
 
G¯G° = ¯° ±¯°²
 ±I¯I°²

                                                          (18a) 
 
Equation (18a) breaks down the variation in output per worker among cities into variations in 
TFP, capital per worker, and human capital. Such a decomposition is useful. For example, one 






-.¶                                                                 (18b) 
 
                                               
73 I use the same value of α for each city since the Cobb–Douglas framework suffers from the unit-invariance 
problem when the factor shares are indexed by city (see Appendix A.10 for a demonstration of this point). 
Appendix A.10 also provides an exercise with a more flexible formulation that does not assume a common labour 
share across cities. 
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Equation (18b) shows how much more productive a worker in city i is compared to one in city 
j.  Here I compare all cities against Shanghai. Shanghai is chosen as the frontier city due to its 
economic prominence. It is the biggest city in China in terms of population. It ranks among the 
top in terms of development indicators such as average years of schooling and life expectancy. 
In 2009, Shanghai also became the first city in mainland China to pass the $10,000 threshold 
in per capita GDP.74 Shanghai is the financial centre of mainland China. It also leads China in 
industries and commerce. It is also a first-tier city as determined by the NBS. In the 
development accounting exercise, all cities in the sample will be contrasted with Shanghai. 
 
Output per worker is written in terms of the capital-labour ratio and deflated using provincial 
CPI series with labour’s income share being 0.5. I first investigate the relation in 1994 which 
is the start of the period. Then I look at the same relation in 2010 which is the end of the period. 
Panel (a) in Figure 11 shows that a higher level of output per worker relative to Shanghai is 
associated with a higher level of human capital. Panel (b) in Figure 11 shows that the 
relationship is stronger in 2010. In time cities with higher human capital have been able to take 
advantage of better technology, higher quality institutions, etc. As a result, the correlation 
between the two have become stronger.  
 
Most cities are clustered around the bottom-left corner in panel (a) in Figure 11. In this region, 
two sub-groups are visible on the graph, separated by the regression line. Cities are 
concentrated either below or above it. Cities above the regression line have higher levels of 
human capital, but they have not transformed into higher levels of income. In panel (b) in 
                                               
74 Shanghai is the first province-level administrative unit to achieve that goal. There have been smaller cities, such 
as Ordos, a prefecture-level city in Inner Mongolia that witnessed a housing boom in the early 2000s, that have 
already reached higher levels of output per capita. Also note that some sources claim Shanghai passed USD 10,000 
in per capita GDP in 2008 instead of 2009. This thesis relies on official data found at the following address: 
http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/tjnj/nj16.htm?d1=2016tjnj/C0405.htm  
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Figure 11 the separation disappears and most cities seem to cluster in the bottom-left region. 
This shows that cities have “caught up” to some extent in terms of human capital, but their 
income levels still lag behind Shanghai and gaps in output per worker levels have not been 
closed. Nevertheless, increasing human capital by expanding school enrolment, encouraging 
tertiary education, and lowering dropout rates are still promising routes to achieving higher 
income levels. On the one hand, higher levels of human capital transform into higher levels of 
TFP which in turn raises output per worker levels. On the other hand, it may be relatively cheap 
for the government to invest in education than to add more physical capital. 
 
Panel (a) in Figure 12 shows that output per worker is strongly and positively correlated with 
capital per worker in 1994. Panel (b) in Figure 12 displays that the relationship is stronger in 
2010. This finding is important in two aspects. First, it offers empirical evidence for a large 
body of research which links capital deepening with economic growth. Cities with higher levels 
of capital per worker enjoy higher levels of income (output per worker).75 As shown in Chapter 
6.1, whereas all cities have experienced capital deepening during the period, the significance 
of capital deepening varies widely across the sample. Tier-1 cities have had modest 
contributions from capital deepening. But Tier-2 and 3 cities have relied heavily on it. 
Therefore, whereas in terms of levels, higher levels of capital have brought higher levels of 
income, in terms of growth rates, growth has been overwhelmingly dependent on capital 
                                               
75 Tier-1 cities, which have also been accumulating capital, seem to have not run into diminishing returns. One 
possible explanation may be that TFP levels are correlated with capital deepening. Regressing the logarithm of 
relative output per worker to the logarithm of relative capital per worker in 2010 gives a coefficient of 0.87, with 
a standard error of 0.0573, and R2 is 0.77. R2 goes up to 0.81 if I include relative human capital differences as a 
second explanatory variable. These may suggest that TFP levels are correlated with endowments of physical 
capital. Cities with higher levels of capital per worker, especially Tier-1 cities, tend to have higher levels of TFP. 
This provides evidence for the hypothesis that TFP is embedded in capital goods. Economies with more capital 
tend to be more productive (see, for example, Baier et al., 2006; Mutreja et al., 2018). The coefficient also 
reaffirms the high return to capital found in Bai et al. (2006). Another interpretation may be that there is still room 
of capital deepening for many Chinese cities as they are far away from their balanced growth paths.  
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deepening. This is unsustainable, which is why I argue that, apart from committing to new 
capital expenditures, policymakers need to pay attention to efficiency as well. 
 
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 13 plot relative capital intensity (capital-output ratio) against 
relative output per worker for 1994 and 2010. I do not observe any systematic association 
between relative output per worker and relative capital intensity levels. Figure 13 shows that 
cities have different levels of capital intensity, ranging from 20% of that in Shanghai to nearly 
twice that of Shanghai. This widely differing capital intensity, however, has not translated into 
higher output per worker levels. Output does not predict capital intensity in 1994. This result 
holds when Shenzhen is excluded.76 
 
Panel (a) in Figure 14 plots relative TFP levels against relative output per worker for 1994. 
Here I find evidence that TFP is positively correlated with output per worker. This finding 
parallels a large body of research which finds that differences in measured TFP explain more 
than half of the cross-country differences in output per worker (Hsieh and Klenow, 2010; Jones 
and Romer, 2010). TFP and output per worker levels are correlated as far back as 1994, when 
the Chinese economy was far less efficient than it is today. In the years since, TFP’s role has 
only become stronger. Panel (b) in Figure 14 shows that TFP differences are almost perfectly 
correlated with output per worker differences. Jones (2016) graphs TFP and output per worker 
levels for countries and find the two are highly correlated at 0.96. Here I plot TFP and output 
per worker levels for Chinese cities and find a correlation of 0.95.77 The well-documented fact 
that variation in TFP levels explains most of the variation in income levels across countries 
                                               
76 When regressing the logarithm of relative output per worker on logarithm of relative capital intensity for 2010, 
the coefficient is -0.43 and significant only at 10%. It is -0.17 when Shenzhen is excluded from the sample, but 
no longer statistically significant. This shows that a simple strategy of increasing capital intensity has not been 
sufficient to increase income levels relative to Shanghai. 
77 Appendix A.11 provides correlations where (i) I take logarithms of the variables, and (ii) I exclude Shenzhen 
from my sample. 
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applies to Chinese cities as well (see Figure 10). This is important. Both panels in Figure 14, 
in addition to Figure 10 suggest that policymakers should pursue those policies that improve 
TFP.78  
 
Potential areas of focus include higher levels of human capital (both in education and health), 
which enable the workforce to pick up better technology. Other choices are more openness to 
trade, higher research and development (R&D) expenditures, and better institutions, etc. 
Capital deepening is widely recognised to increase productivity, at least in the medium term. 
Potential policies include easier access to credit, financial market development, and lower 
transactions costs, etc. TFP is a proximate determinant of income. This thesis does not deal 
with deep determinants of income. Nevertheless, this thesis has shown that TFP levels are 
hugely important in determining income levels in Chinese cities. TFP growth rates are also 
very important. The more a city’s growth comes from TFP growth, the more sustainable its 
growth is going to be. This thesis has also shown that what sets Tier-1 cities apart is the fact 
that they all derive over half of their output growth from growth in TFP. Indeed, 0.5 is like a 
watershed. In other words, if a city can manage to derive over half of its growth from growth 
in TFP, it becomes “like” a first-tier city.  
 
6.2.3 Tier-1, 2, and 3 Cities 
Here I investigate the growth performance of Tier-1, 2 and 3 cities as separate groups instead 
of looking at individual cities. Each tier is compared with all 69 cities which I have called 
“aggregate”. Figure 15 and Table 7 show that there has been intensive capital deepening in 
Tier-2 and 3 cities, while growth in Tier-1 cities is mainly driven by TFP. Output per worker 
in Tier-2 and 3 cities actually falls relative to the 69. TFP falls as well. Tier-1 cities, however, 
                                               
78 Isaksson (2007) provides a comprehensive discussion on the determinants of TFP.  
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have gone up in both TFP and income levels relative to the 69-city aggregate group. This 
corresponds with previous findings on growth accounting where Tier-2 and 3 cities have had 
low TFP contributions during the period. The top-left panel in Figure 15 shows that Tier-1 
cities have surged ahead, while Tier-2 and 3 cities have grown at a similar pace. As shown 
previously, income levels are highly associated with TFP levels. The bottom-right panel in 
Figure 15 shows that Tier-2 and 3 cities have converged to similar TFP levels as of 2010, which 
would predict similar income levels between them (Appendix A.12 provides a simple test for 




7. Conclusions with Policy Implications 
This thesis investigates the proximate determinants of variation in output per worker levels and 
growth rates among 69 major Chinese cities. I find a clear distinction between Tier-1 cities and 
the rest. In terms of growth rates, growth in Tier-1 cities is driven primarily by TFP growth. 
On the other hand, TFP growth contributes a lot less to growth in Tier-2 and 3 cities. Growth 
in Tier-2 and 3 cities depends overwhelmingly on accumulation of physical capital. This is 
unsustainable in the long run, as capital suffers from diminishing returns. As Krugman (1994b, 
p. 63) puts it, “economic growth that is based on an expansion of inputs, rather than on growth 
in output per unit of input, is inevitably subject to diminishing returns.” In terms of income 
levels, I find that they are highly correlated with TFP levels. I also find a declining role of 
variation in factor endowments in explaining variation in income levels. 
 
I conclude that TFP is the predominant factor in explaining economic prosperity in a city. 
Factor endowments play a secondary role. Rapid accumulation of physical capital in Tier-2 
cities has not closed the gap in income levels between them and Tier-1 cities. Similarly, growth 
in human capital has played a minor role as well. It is important, however, to note the increasing 
returns to schooling in Chinese cities. Investing in education may be an effective and affordable 
way for city officials to close the income gap between their cities and Shanghai. Possible 
channels for this can be related to the ones in Nelson and Phelps (1966) and/or Romer (1990). 
For example, Nelson and Phelps (1966) find human capital as a critical factor in promoting 
technological diffusion, providing a way of thinking about technology transfer that 
incorporates human capital. Romer (1990) asserts that a higher level of human capital 
stimulates productivity growth through new technological innovations. 
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In line with my findings, I propose that city officials pay attention to TFP in policy-making. 
Higher TFP means higher output per worker. Finally, policymakers need to be aware of the 
falling capital-output ratio in Tier-1 cities and contrast that with rising capital-output ratios in 
their cities. Rapid accumulation of physical capital in Tier-2 and 3 cities has already run into 
diminishing returns. I propose a slow-down in physical capital accumulation in Tier-2 and 3 
cities. 
 
In recent years, there has been growing interest in whether China can avoid the “middle-income 
trap”. This is where a country’s growth in income per capita slows down abruptly after reaching 
an income level of over 10,000 U.S. dollars. My findings suggest that the threat of falling into 
a middle-income trap is real for China. Indeed, China’s quarterly GDP growth rate has fallen 
from 11.9% in the first quarter of 2010 to 6.8% in the third quarter of 2017.79 If growth slows 
down in its 69 major cities, it is doubtful that the country as a whole will do much better. 
Eichengreen et al. (2013) find that countries with more university graduates are less likely to 
fall into the middle-income trap. This reaffirms my policy proposal of investing in human 
capital.  
 
Policymakers in China need to shift their attention away from accumulation of physical capital, 
and focus on human capital and TFP. Economic well-being at the city level in China will 
depend ultimately on TFP levels rather than factor endowments, and TFP growth instead of 
factor accumulation. This will also have implications for aggregate productivity growth for the 
nation. Higher aggregate TFP growth can be achieved by shifting the production frontier 
outward (through technological innovations) for all cities but also by closing the gap between 
                                               
79 For quarterly GDP growth rates, see http://intl.ce.cn/specials/zxxx/201501/20/t20150120_4389474.shtml and 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201710/t20171020_1544259.html  
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the frontier and laggard cities. Identifying relative contributions of these factors to TFP growth 
would provide further insights to productivity prospects and policy options (Cardarelli and 
Lusinyan, 2015). 
 
A further avenue of research is to investigate the linkages between structural transformation 
(i.e., the reallocation of economic activity across the broad sectors) and economic development 
at the city level in China. For example, Chanda and Panda (2016) examine the importance of 
TFP growth in goods and services for US states during 1980-2007. Their findings indicate very 
different patterns for the two broad sectors, with the former (goods) exhibiting convergence 
and the latter (services) exhibiting slow growth and no convergence. It is certainly interesting 
to study such sectoral dynamics at the city level in China. 
 
Another direction of research is the relationship between intangible investment/capital and 
measured productivity since the inclusion/exclusion of intangibles (such as research and 
development, software, brands, etc.) changes the total output and the related calculations (see 
Corrado et al., 2009; McGrattan and Prescott, 2010). Li and Wu (2017) incorporate intangible 
capital in growth accounting. They study China at the province level during 2003-2014, and 
find significant contribution from intangibles in coastal regions. Interior regions, on the other 
hand, rely more on tangible capital deepening. Having said that, the authors acknowledge that 
TFP still plays an important role in driving growth in China. My thesis can be linked to their 
findings. Tier-1 cities loosely correspond with coastal regions, and Tier-2 and 3 cities with 
interior regions. I find that Tier-1 cities rely mostly on TFP growth whereas Tier-2 and 3 cities 
rely mostly on capital deepening. Li and Wu (2017) show that this result still stands when 
intangible capital is added to the production function. 
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Another avenue of research is to construct dual measures of city-specific TFP growth.  I have 
focused on the primal (quantity) growth accounting procedure in this thesis. There is also a 
dual (real factor prices) growth accounting specification in the literature. The construction of 
dual TFP growth measures relies on real user cost growth and real wage growth and can be 
calculated as weighted averages of the growth rates of different types of capital goods and 
wages of different types of workers, where the weights are the shares of payments to each 
factor (Hsieh, 2002). Collecting real factor prices at the city level constitute a data challenge 
for China.80 It would be interesting to see if measures of primal and dual TFP growth are close 
to each other for each city in China.81 
                                               
80 Panda (2017) exploits the dual growth accounting framework to determine the effect of schooling on TFP 
growth for US states over 1980-2010. 
81 Hsieh (2002) present dual estimates of TFP growth for East Asian countries. While the dual estimates of TFP 
growth for Korea and Hong Kong are similar to the primal estimates, they exceed the primal estimates by 1% a 
year for Taiwan and by more than 2% for Singapore. Fernald and Neiman (2011) show that measures of primal 
and dual TFP growth can diverge from each other and from true technology growth in the presence of 




Figure 1. Distribution of GDP per capita for U.S. states, 1997-2016 
 
                       Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Regional Economic Accounts. 
 
Figure 2. Share of total population living in urban areas (%), 1960-2016 
 



































Figure 3. Distribution of GDP per worker of the 69 major Chinese cities, 1994-2015 
 
           Source: Own calculations based on the City Statistical Yearbooks.  
 
Figure 4. China city map: Major cities 
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Figure 5. Shenzhen: 1964 versus 2015 
 
Panel (a): Shenzhen in 1964 
  
 







Figure 6. Shanghai: 1990 versus 2010 
 











Figure 7. National and provincial deflators for fixed assets (preceding year=100) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
 






















Figure 10. Success indicators over time 
 













































































Figure 11. Human capital and output per worker 
 
Panel (a): 1994 
 
 




Figure 12. Capital per worker and output per worker 
 
Panel (a): 1994 
 
 
Panel (b): 2010 
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Figure 13. Capital intensity and output per worker 
 




Panel (b): 2010 
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Figure 14. TFP levels and output per worker 
 
Panel (a): 1994 
 
 
Panel (b): 2010 
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Table 1. Breakdown of changes in employment statistics 
Year Employed in work units Employed in private firms 
1994 Total, Employed N.A. 
1995 Total, Employed Urban, Self-employed 
1996 Total, Employed Urban, Self-employed 
1997 Total, Employed Urban, Self-employed 
1998 Total, Employed Urban, Self-employed 
1999 Work units, Employed Urban, Self-employed 
2000 Work units, Employed Urban, Self-employed 
2001 Work units, Employed Urban, Self-employed 
2002 Work units, Employed Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2003 Work units, Employed Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2004 Work units, Employed Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2005 Work units, Employed Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2006 End-of-year, Work units, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2007 End-of-year, Work units, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2008 End-of-year, Work units, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2009 End-of-year, Work units, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2010 End-of-year, Work units, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2011 End-of-year, Work units, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2012 End-of-year, Work units, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2013 End-of-year, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2014 End-of-year, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 
2015 End-of-year, Urban, Work units, Employed Urban, Privately owned firms, Self-employed 















Secondary school and below 4.1% 2.9% 4.3% 
High school or specialised 
secondary school 
7.3% 8.6% 7.4% 
Junior college and above 14.1% 11.6% 11.5% 
Average rate of return to 
schooling 
9.9% 8.4% 7.4% 




Table 3. Naïve labour shares for 31 provinces in selected years 
  1994 1999 2004 2009 2015 Average St. deviation 
Beijing 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.60 0.55 0.46 0.04 
Tianjin 0.44 0.50 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.06 
Hebei 0.55 0.54 0.41 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.04 
Shanxi 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.46 0.48 0.41 0.04 
Inner Mongolia 0.60 0.53 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.07 
Liaoning 0.46 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.03 
Jilin 0.61 0.62 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.51 0.11 
Heilongjiang 0.41 0.47 0.36 0.41 0.47 0.42 0.05 
Shanghai 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.38 0.03 
Jiangsu 0.45 0.46 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.03 
Zhejiang 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.48 0.42 0.02 
Anhui 0.57 0.52 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.05 
Fujian 0.51 0.52 0.44 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.03 
Jiangxi 0.65 0.62 0.56 0.41 0.42 0.52 0.09 
Shandong 0.45 0.46 0.35 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.04 
Henan 0.61 0.51 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.06 
Hubei 0.53 0.61 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.53 0.08 
Hunan 0.62 0.60 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.55 0.06 
Guangdong 0.53 0.55 0.48 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.04 
Guangxi 0.62 0.60 0.49 0.60 0.53 0.58 0.05 
Hainan 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.50 0.03 
Chongqing   0.56 0.52 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.05 
Sichuan 0.57 0.58 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.06 
Guizhou 0.63 0.65 0.46 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.06 
Yunnan 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.02 
Tibet 0.81 0.64 0.55 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.09 
Shaanxi 0.58 0.50 0.40 0.45 0.43 0.47 0.07 
Gansu 0.51 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.04 
Qinghai 0.55 0.56 0.47 0.54 0.47 0.51 0.05 
Ningxia 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.51 0.02 
Xinjiang 0.52 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.53 0.04 
        Source: Own calculations based on the data from the NBS website. 







Table 4. Adjusted labour shares for 31 provinces in selected years 
  1994 1999 2004 2009 2015 Average St. deviation 
Beijing 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.60 0.64 0.54 0.05 
Tianjin 0.52 0.61 0.41 0.45 0.49 0.48 0.07 
Hebei 0.61 0.60 0.47 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.04 
Shanxi 0.50 0.47 0.42 0.54 0.57 0.49 0.05 
Inner Mongolia 0.68 0.60 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.08 
Liaoning 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.59 0.54 0.56 0.03 
Jilin 0.68 0.70 0.53 0.47 0.51 0.58 0.11 
Heilongjiang 0.50 0.57 0.42 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.06 
Shanghai 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.55 0.47 0.04 
Jiangsu 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.03 
Zhejiang 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.56 0.49 0.03 
Anhui 0.67 0.61 0.52 0.59 0.55 0.58 0.05 
Fujian 0.57 0.58 0.51 0.61 0.63 0.57 0.04 
Jiangxi 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.51 0.51 0.60 0.09 
Shandong 0.53 0.54 0.41 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.04 
Henan 0.69 0.58 0.51 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.06 
Hubei 0.60 0.70 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.08 
Hunan 0.73 0.68 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.05 
Guangdong 0.61 0.65 0.56 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.04 
Guangxi 0.70 0.67 0.55 0.68 0.65 0.66 0.04 
Hainan 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.62 0.64 0.58 0.05 
Chongqing  0.65 0.61 0.59 0.51 0.60 0.05 
Sichuan 0.66 0.71 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.07 
Guizhou 0.75 0.79 0.54 0.63 0.68 0.67 0.08 
Yunnan 0.58 0.63 0.55 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.02 
Tibet 0.83 0.67 0.58 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.08 
Shaanxi 0.63 0.60 0.46 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.07 
Gansu 0.60 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.60 0.60 0.04 
Qinghai 0.61 0.63 0.54 0.63 0.53 0.58 0.04 
Ningxia 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.59 0.02 
Xinjiang 0.58 0.63 0.61 0.64 0.68 0.60 0.04 
        Source: Own calculations based on the data from the NBS website. 










Table 5. Contributions to output per worker, 1994-2010 (α=0.5) 
  Using Provincial CPI Deflators for Output Using Implicit GDP Deflator for China 
  Y/L TFP K/L h Y/L TFP K/L h 
Beijing 100.0 56.5 40.0 3.5 100.0 53.7 42.6 3.7 
Tianjin 100.0 39.6 57.8 2.6 100.0 33.2 63.9 2.9 
Shijiazhuang 100.0 7.3 90.4 2.2 100.0 -13.2 110.5 2.7 
Taiyuan 100.0 41.9 54.1 3.9 100.0 37.4 58.3 4.3 
Hohhot 100.0 42.8 55.4 1.8 100.0 39.8 58.3 1.9 
Shenyang 100.0 22.2 74.6 3.2 100.0 12.1 84.3 3.6 
Dalian 100.0 18.5 79.2 2.3 100.0 7.3 90.1 2.6 
Changchun 100.0 10.9 87.1 2.0 100.0 -1.2 98.9 2.3 
Harbin 100.0 35.6 62.7 1.7 100.0 27.0 71.0 1.9 
Shanghai 100.0 57.8 39.6 2.6 100.0 54.2 43.0 2.8 
Nanjing 100.0 -0.5 96.0 4.5 100.0 -14.4 109.3 5.1 
Hangzhou 100.0 3.9 93.6 2.5 100.0 -11.4 108.4 2.9 
Ningbo 100.0 31.9 67.2 0.9 100.0 24.3 74.7 1.0 
Hefei 100.0 28.1 70.3 1.6 100.0 21.5 76.7 1.8 
Fuzhou 100.0 4.4 94.0 1.6 100.0 -14.1 112.2 1.9 
Xiamen 100.0 18.7 77.4 3.9 100.0 -0.3 95.5 4.8 
Nanchang 100.0 22.0 75.9 2.1 100.0 13.6 84.1 2.3 
Jinan 100.0 30.8 66.7 2.5 100.0 24.6 72.7 2.7 
Qingdao 100.0 32.9 65.2 1.8 100.0 27.0 71.1 2.0 
Zhengzhou 100.0 34.7 61.0 4.3 100.0 25.3 69.8 4.9 
Wuhan 100.0 28.9 67.4 3.7 100.0 24.0 72.1 3.9 
Changsha 100.0 21.4 76.4 2.1 100.0 17.4 80.4 2.2 
Guangzhou 100.0 53.3 44.1 2.6 100.0 44.9 52.0 3.1 
Shenzhen 100.0 57.2 40.6 2.2 100.0 47.9 49.5 2.7 
Nanning 100.0 11.6 87.6 0.8 100.0 -3.3 102.4 0.9 
Haikou 100.0 50.2 38.9 10.9 100.0 -82.1 142.3 39.7 
Chongqing 100.0 -7.5 106.3 1.2 100.0 -31.0 129.5 1.5 
Chengdu 100.0 16.6 81.3 2.1 100.0 13.3 84.5 2.2 
Guiyang 100.0 6.2 92.3 1.6 100.0 0.3 98.1 1.7 
Kunming 100.0 -6.9 105.6 1.3 100.0 -13.6 112.2 1.4 
Xian 100.0 9.2 87.0 3.8 100.0 0.7 95.2 4.1 
Lanzhou 100.0 11.3 84.5 4.2 100.0 5.8 89.8 4.4 
Xining 100.0 26.7 72.4 0.8 100.0 29.1 70.1 0.8 
Yinchuan 100.0 47.3 50.5 2.2 100.0 43.8 53.8 2.3 
Urumqi 100.0 49.7 46.1 4.3 100.0 46.6 48.9 4.5 
Tangshan 100.0 32.6 65.9 1.6 100.0 23.8 74.5 1.8 
Qinhuangdao 100.0 26.6 71.2 2.2 100.0 10.9 86.4 2.7 
Baotou 100.0 45.6 53.1 1.3 100.0 42.9 55.7 1.4 
Dandong 100.0 -19.1 117.7 1.4 100.0 -43.7 141.9 1.7 
Jinzhou 100.0 37.5 61.4 1.1 100.0 26.1 72.6 1.3 
Jilin 100.0 34.5 64.4 1.2 100.0 25.3 73.4 1.3 
Mudanjiang 100.0 43.6 54.8 1.6 100.0 33.0 65.1 1.9 
Wuxi 100.0 13.7 84.6 1.7 100.0 3.3 94.8 1.9 
Xuzhou 100.0 -16.4 115.0 1.4 100.0 -39.0 137.4 1.6 
Yangzhou 100.0 36.2 62.8 1.0 100.0 27.3 71.6 1.1 
Wenzhou 100.0 19.3 79.7 1.0 100.0 9.7 89.1 1.2 
Jinhua 100.0 -3.2 101.8 1.3 100.0 -20.6 119.0 1.5 
Bengbu 100.0 1.9 96.6 1.5 100.0 -12.4 110.7 1.7 
Anqing 100.0 51.5 47.2 1.2 100.0 44.5 54.1 1.4 
Quanzhou 100.0 35.1 63.0 2.0 100.0 23.9 73.8 2.3 
Jiujiang 100.0 42.4 56.4 1.2 100.0 35.8 62.9 1.3 
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Table 5 (continued). 
  Using Provincial CPI Deflators for Output Using Implicit GDP Deflator for China 
  Y/L TFP K/L h Y/L TFP K/L h 
Ganzhou 100.0 27.8 71.5 0.7 100.0 19.3 79.9 0.8 
Yantai 100.0 15.4 83.3 1.3 100.0 8.4 90.2 1.4 
Jining 100.0 4.6 93.4 2.1 100.0 -5.3 103.0 2.3 
Luoyang 100.0 4.7 94.5 0.8 100.0 -7.0 106.1 0.9 
Pingdingshan 100.0 41.8 57.1 1.1 100.0 35.7 63.1 1.2 
Yichang 100.0 72.8 26.0 1.2 100.0 70.5 28.2 1.3 
Xiangyang 100.0 11.2 87.3 1.6 100.0 -4.6 102.7 1.8 
Yueyang 100.0 57.6 40.6 1.8 100.0 55.0 43.1 1.9 
Changde 100.0 32.9 65.7 1.4 100.0 30.0 68.6 1.4 
Shaoguan 100.0 27.5 71.0 1.5 100.0 -2.4 100.2 2.2 
Zhanjiang 100.0 62.8 35.6 1.6 100.0 55.2 42.8 2.0 
Huizhou 100.0 43.6 55.1 1.3 100.0 29.9 68.4 1.7 
Guilin 100.0 44.7 54.6 0.7 100.0 36.3 62.9 0.8 
Beihai 100.0 10.0 86.6 3.4 100.0 -21.3 116.6 4.6 
Sanya 100.0 53.1 44.0 2.9 100.0 45.2 51.5 3.3 
Luzhou 100.0 21.4 77.8 0.7 100.0 15.9 83.3 0.8 
Nanchong 100.0 -0.4 100.0 0.4 100.0 -4.0 103.6 0.4 
Zunyi 100.0 12.9 86.8 0.3 100.0 6.8 92.8 0.3 



















Table 6. Growth accounting results 
                                Average annual changes (%) Contributions 
 Tier-1  Y/L TFP K/L h Y/L TFP K/L h 
1994-2001 9.0  5.3  3.5  0.2  100  59.2  38.4  2.4  
2001-2007 14.3  8.7  5.2  0.4  100  61.0  36.3  2.7  
2007-2009 7.2  2.5  4.3  0.4  100  34.9  59.9  5.2  
2009-2010 10.2  5.6  4.2  0.4  100  54.9  41.5  3.6  
1994-2010 10.8  6.3  4.3  0.3  100  57.8  39.3  2.8  
                               Average annual changes (%) Contributions 
 Tier-2  Y/L TFP K/L h Y/L TFP K/L h 
1994-2001 7.8  1.9  5.8  0.1  100  24.5  74.6  0.9  
2001-2007 10.4  2.5  7.5  0.3  100  24.6  72.4  3.0  
2007-2009 12.2  2.9  8.9  0.4  100  24.0  72.6  3.5  
2009-2010 10.2  1.4  8.3  0.5  100  13.8  81.4  4.8  
1994-2010 9.5  2.2  7.0  0.2  100  23.7  73.8  2.5  
                                Average annual changes (%) Contributions 
 Tier-3  Y/L TFP K/L h Y/L TFP K/L h 
1994-2001 7.3  2.4  4.9  0.0  100  33.0  67.1  -0.1  
2001-2007 12.1  4.5  7.4  0.2  100  37.1  61.2  1.8  
2007-2009 10.5  2.3  8.0  0.2  100  22.2  75.6  2.2  
2009-2010 10.7  3.4  7.0  0.3  100  31.8  65.8  2.4  
1994-2010 9.7  3.2  6.3  0.1  100  33.3  65.4  1.3  
                               Average annual changes (%) Contributions 
 Aggregate Y/L TFP K/L h Y/L TFP K/L h 
1994-2001 8.1  3.3  4.7  0.1  100  41.2  57.7  1.0  
2001-2007 11.7  4.9  6.6  0.3  100  41.8  55.8  2.4  
2007-2009 10.3  2.5  7.4  0.4  100  24.6  71.8  3.6  
2009-2010 10.0  2.7  6.9  0.4  100  27.3  68.8  4.0  
1994-2010 9.9  3.8  5.9  0.2  100  38.4  59.4  2.2  













    
1994 1.54  1.55  1.04  0.95  
2010 1.80  1.20  1.06  1.42  
Tier-2 
    
1994 0.92  0.83  0.98  1.13  
2010 0.86  0.99  0.98  0.88  
Tier-3 
    
1994 0.76  0.78  1.02  0.96  
2010 0.74  0.85  1.00  0.87  
Source: Own calculations based on data presented in Chapter 4.  
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A.1 List of Cities in the Sample  
70-city sample: (1) Anqing, (2) Baotou, (3) Beihai, (4) Beijing, (5) Bengbu, (6) Changchun, 
(7) Changde, (8) Changsha, (9) Chengdu, (10) Chongqing, (11) Dalian, (12) Dandong, (13) 
Fuzhou, (14) Ganzhou, (15) Guangzhou, (16) Guilin, (17) Guiyang, (18) Haikou, (19) 
Hangzhou, (20) Harbin, (21) Hefei, (22) Hohhot, (23) Huizhou, (24) Jilin, (25) Jinan, (26) 
Jinhua, (27) Jining, (28) Jinzhou, (29) Jining, (30) Kunming, (31) Lanzhou, (32) Luoyang, (33) 
Luzhou, (34) Mudanjiang, (35) Nanchang, (36) Nanchong, (37) Nanjing, (38) Nanning, (39) 
Ningbo, (40) Pingdingshan, (41) Qingdao, (42) Qinhuangdao, (43) Quanzhou, (44) Sanya, (45) 
Shanghai, (46) Shaoguan, (47) Shenyang, (48) Shenzhen, (49) Shijiazhuang, (50) Taiyuan, (51) 
Tangshan, (52) Tianjin, (53) Urumqi, (54) Wenzhou, (55) Wuhan, (56) Wuxi, (57) Xiamen, 
(58) Xian, (59) Xiangfan/Xiangyang, (60) Xining, (61) Xuzhou, (62) Yangzhou, (63) Yantai, 
(64) Yichang, (65) Yinchuan, (66) Yueyang, (67) Zhanjiang, (68) Zhengzhou, (69) Zunyi. 
Dali is dropped because it is a county-level city. Statistics for county-level cities are calculated 
differently to those for prefecture-level cities. As a result, they are not comparable.82 
  
                                               
82 See, for example, China City Statistical Yearbook 2015, p. 1. 
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A.2 Household Registry System83 
The hu’kou system began in August 1950 with a decree issued by the Ministry of Public 
Security.84 Back then, the purpose of hu’kou is to restore social stability, and monitor, but not 
control, population movement. But as China prioritised heavy industry, and set up a planned 
economy based on the Soviet model, policymakers saw the need to finance the industrial 
projects, as well as the urgency to generate an agricultural surplus in order to support heavy 
industrial development. Policies shifted to preventing peasants from entering cities. 
 
A landmark document is the Decree on preventing rural population from blindly leaving85 
issued on 18 December 1957. Less than a month later, on 9 January 1958, the National People’s 
Congress passed a bill titled Regulation on household registry of the P.R.C.86 This law became 
the basis of the hu’kou system. Article 10 of this legislation states that, when citizens relocate 
from rural to urban areas, they must carry a hiring contract for the work unit they are going to 
work in, or an offer of admission at a school, or a letter of approval by the urban household 
registry for them to move. 
 
The rigidness of the hu’kou system is not relaxed until after 1978, when the market economy 
started to develop. In October 1984, the State Department issued a notice which allowed 
peasants to obtain non-agricultural hu’kou in counties and small towns.87 In July 1985, the 
Ministry of Public Security issued a temporary regulation which allowed peasants who have 
migrated to cities to obtain temporary residence permits.88 In a document released in May 1997, 
                                               







skilled peasants, peasants who have bought houses in cities, etc. were allowed to obtain non-
agricultural hu’kou.89 Nevertheless, “mechanical increases” in the population of big cities like 
Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai were strongly discouraged. The hu’kou system is further relaxed 
in a document issued by the State Department in July 1998 which allowed new-born infants to 
follow either parent’s hu’kou, among other policy changes. But it still calls for strict control of 
the hu’kou of big cities like Beijing and Shanghai.90 More recently, in a document issued in 
March 2001, peasants are allowed to obtain non-agricultural hu’kou in “small towns” which 
included county-level cities and other small urban centres.91 Since then there have been more 
reforms of hu’kou, generally aimed at relaxing restrictions on rural-urban migration as well as 
eliminating the rural-urban divide. In some cities, it is now possible to migrate one’s hu’kou 
under a point-based skilled migration system.92 In July 2014, the State Department issued a 
decree which says China would gradually eliminate the agricultural and non-agricultural 
hu’kou divide.93 Each province issued their own plans afterwards. 
 
The hu’kou system has two fundamental features. First, it is compulsory. Second, it is dual-
track: agricultural and non-agricultural. The law of January 1958 makes it clear that every 
Chinese citizen must obtain hu’kou. (Interestingly enough, the law also requires foreigners 
living in China at the time, as well as people without nationalities, to obtain hu’kou!) Under 
the planned economy, hu’kou is almost the only form of ID that people had (the national ID 
system is approved in September 198594). Up until the decree of July 1988, new-born infants 
generally followed the mother’s hu’kou, which eliminates the incentive for women to marry 











into cities. The compulsory nature of hu’kou, combined with the fact that people need it to have 
access to food, housing, health care, education, jobs, superannuation, social welfare, etc. means 
that migration, rural-urban or between cities, is practically impossible in China under the 
planned economy. The reforms after 1978 essentially allowed rural residents to come to cities, 
live, and work, without granting them local, non-agricultural hu’kou. This has the effect of 
increasing the resident population of cities without catering to the new arrivals’ social benefits 
such as their children’s education, superannuation and health care, etc. 
 
The other feature of hu’kou is its dual-track nature, which has persisted to the present day. 
Hu’kou is registered for a place of residence as well as status: agricultural and non-
agricultural.95 A non-agricultural hu’kou conveys huge advantages to its holder. In the planned 
economy, while almost every aspect of an urban resident’s life is taken care of by the state, 
such as food, education, housing, health care, employment, superannuation, etc., rural residents 
do not enjoy any of these. Peasants work in collectives which have to fulfil food rations to the 
state.96 Collectives have since disappeared.97 Market economy has prospered in cities. But the 
dual-track nature of hu’kou has remained in most places. 
 
Under the planned economy, the effect of hu’kou on migration is that it essentially eliminated 
migration, whether rural-urban or urban-urban. In fact, China’s urbanisation rate stagnated 
during the planned economy years.98 After 1978, migration from rural to urban areas and 
between urban areas was relaxed, first into small towns, and then into bigger cities.99 Wu and 
Treiman (2007) study the effect of hu’kou on intergenerational occupational mobility. They 
                                               
95 Naughton (2007, p. 124). 
96 Ibid. pp. 114-115. 
97 Ibid. p. 89. 
98 Ibid. p. 126. 
99 See, for example, 《关于加强小城镇建设的若干意见》, 《小城镇综合改革试点指导意见》, 《关于加强
城市建设工作的意见》,《城市规划条例》 
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find that agricultural (rural) hu’kou blocks upward mobility for most workers. Furthermore, 
workers of rural origin, even though their parents do not work in agriculture, are vulnerable to 
downward mobility back into agriculture. Lu (2008) finds that the effect of hu’kou on social 
mobility has weakened as restrictions on hu’kou were relaxed over time. However, an urban 
hu’kou continues to benefit its holder in terms of career advancement. Using the 1998 Survey 
of Occupational Mobility and Migration (SOMM), and data from Beijing, Wuxi and Zhuhai, 
Zhang (2010) finds that temporary migrants (also known as the “floating population”) have 
longer job durations as well as shorter unemployment durations when compared to locals and 
permanent migrants (those who have already obtained local hu’kou in cities). Zhang attributes 
this finding to the higher job-searching costs temporary migrants face, due to them not having 
local hu’kou. 
 
Bosker et al. (2012) study the effects of a relaxation of hu’kou on China’s economic geography. 
The authors survey 264 cities at prefecture-level and above, and find that relaxing hu’kou 
would lead to a more uneven distribution of city size in China. China’s biggest cities, Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chongqing would grow bigger and carry more weight in the 
economy. This finding is in line with the opinion that China’s megacities are undersized. Song 
(2014) finds that rural migrants face higher living costs and have less access to government 
services such as housing and public education for their children. As a result, although a strict 
prohibition on migration is a thing of the past, and workers nowadays can freely relocate to 
cities, hu’kou discourages migration by reducing expected payoffs. Chan (2013) documents 
the patterns of migration within China. He observes that the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze 
River Delta have remained the most popular destinations for workers over time. He argues that 
hurdles imposed by the hu’kou system are a major obstacle China has to overcome in order to 
achieve sustained high growth. 
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A.3 Administrative Hierarchy of Cities 
There are several ways to categorise cities in China.100 The tables below give detailed lists of 
different categorisations. As shown, different groupings overlap with each other. 
Table A1. Tier-1, 2, and 3 cities as defined by the NBS 




Tianjin, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Hohhot, Shenyang, Dalian, 
Changchun, Harbin, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Hefei, Fuzhou, 
Xiamen, Nanchang, Jinan, Qingdao, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, 
Nanning, Haikou, Chongqing, Chengdu, Guiyang, Kunming, Xian, 




Tangshan, Qinhuangdao, Baotou, Dandong, Jinzhou, Jilin, 
Mudanjiang, Wuxi, Xuzhou, Yangzhou, Wenzhou, Jinhua, Bengbu, 
Anqing, Quanzhou, Jiujiang, Ganzhou, Yantai, Jining, Luoyang, 
Pingdingshan, Yichang, Xiangyang 101 , Yueyang, Changde, 
Shaoguan, Zhanjiang, Huizhou, Guilin, Beihai, Sanya, Luzhou, 
Nanchong, Zunyi, Dali(dropped) 
 
Table A2. Different ways of categorising cities within the 69-city sample 
4 province-level cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing. 
 
15 vice-provincial cities: Shenyang, Dalian, Changchun, Harbin, Nanjing, Hangzhou, 
Ningbo, Xiamen, Jinan, Qingdao, Wuhan, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Chengdu, Xian. 
50 prefecture-level cities: Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Hohhot, Hefei, Fuzhou, Nanchang, 
Zhengzhou, Changsha, Nanning, Haikou, Guiyang, Kunming, 
Lanzhou, Xining, Yinchuan, Urumqi, Tangshan, Qinhuangdao, 
Baotou, Dandong, Jinzhou, Jilin, Mudanjiang, Wuxi, Xuzhou, 
Yangzhou, Wenzhou, Jinhua, Bengbu, Anqing, Quanzhou, 
Jiujiang, Ganzhou, Yantai, Jining, Luoyang, Pingdingshan, 
Yichang, Xiangyang 102 , Yueyang, Changde, Shaoguan, 
Zhanjiang, Huizhou, Guilin, Beihai, Sanya, Luzhou, 
Nanchong, Zunyi. 
 
1 county-level city dropped from 
the 70-city sample: 
 
Dali. 
5 cities with independent 
budgetary status: 
Dalian, Ningbo, Xiamen, Qingdao, Shenzhen. 
                                               
100 All information accurate as of 2015. 
101 Changed from Xiangfan in 2011. 
102 Changed from Xiangfan in 2011. 
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A.4 Discussion of Alternative Employment Series 
Li and Gibson (2015) compare the City Statistical Yearbook (CSY) and the 2010 Population 
Census. They note that CSY only counts local hu’kou holders, omitting over 100 million urban 
residents with hu’kou registration from elsewhere and many private sector workers. 
Accordingly, Li and Gibson (2015) use data from the 2010 Population Census instead of CSY 
to get population and employment data. It is important to note that NBS defines urban areas in 
the 2010 census as areas located in or contiguous to the area where the local government is 
located.103 Although the definition is a bit different from that used in the 2000 census, the 
difference is negligible (Chen and Song, 2014). As a result, a prefecture-level city may include 
both urban (cheng’zhen) and rural (xiang’cun) areas. 
 
I estimate another set of employment data using urban population data found in the 2000 and 
2010 County-Level Population Census Reports. Figure A1 plots relative TFP levels and output 
per worker for 69 cities in 2000 and 2010 using the alternative employment data. Data points 
are clustered together. In 2000, the correlation coefficient between relative TFP levels and 
relative output per worker is 0.81 using Census data, and 0.85 using hu’kou data. In 2010, the 
correlation coefficient is 0.91 using Census data, and 0.95 using hu’kou data. Therefore, the 
results do not change qualitatively. In order to maintain consistency, and also because hu’kou 
data are available for each year during 1994-2010 whereas Census data are only available for 
2000 and 2010, I estimate employment series using hu’kou data.104 
 
                                               
103 Wang and Chanda (2017) note that due to administrative reforms between 2000 and 2010, the prefecture-level 
cities reported in the censuses of 2000 and 2010 are not identical. 
104 Should readers be concerned with the accuracy of employment data for any particular city, one solution is to 
obtain statistical yearbooks published by the Bureau of Statistics of that particular city over the period. The 
drawbacks are that some cities do not publish their own statistical yearbooks, and data thus obtained are not as 
comparable as data reported in the China City Statistical Yearbooks. The first column on page 348 of 
http://www.sztj.gov.cn/xxgk/tjsj/tjnj/201712/W020171219625244452877.pdf reports employment for Shenzhen. 
Note that they are for “total city”. Therefore, after taking away some workers who live in the countryside, these 
data correspond quite well with my hu’kou series. 
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Figure A1. Contrasting Hu'kou and Census data 
 
Panel (a): Comparisons for 2000 
 
 









































A.5 Findings on Human Capital 
There are two main findings on human capital. First, average years of schooling calculated by 
the NBS are greater than my own. This is true for both 2000 and 2010. Since average years of 
schooling are not reported for 1990, my own calculations are the only figures available for that 
year, and I could not draw comparisons. Second, human capital calculated from Caselli (2005) 
are greater than Peng 1 (using average returns to schooling) which are in turn greater than Peng 
2 (using different returns to different levels of schooling). A possible reason is that Caselli 
assigns decreasing returns to education, whereas Peng finds increasing returns. This plus the 
fact that the majority of China’s labour force was, at least in the early 2000s, unskilled, means 
that the formula in Caselli (2005) will overestimate human capital in China.  
 
Figure A2 shows a vertical distance of approximately one year between NBS’ estimates and 
those of my own. This is a huge difference for average years of schooling. Therefore, it is 
important to scrutinise data reported by the NBS, and check them against my own estimates. 
Figure A3 shows that in 2010 the differences are higher, at approximately two years. Not only 
have NBS’ estimates remained higher than my own in both censuses, but the differences have 
grown. This further highlights the importance of checking official data against one’s own 
estimates. In order to find out more, I enquired NBS about the formula they use for average 
years of schooling in 2000 and 2010. 105  Their formula for calculating average years of 
schooling for population aged 6 and above (V6) is: 
 V6 =  ∗X!6∗X-∗X+∗XZ6∗(X5X[ X\)]BA ,                                                           (A1) 
                                               
105 Their response can be found online at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfw/tjzx/tjzxbd/201710/t20171007_1540067.html  
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where V denotes no schooling, V primary school, V secondary school, V2 high school, V 
junior college (da’zhuan), V  undergraduate, V6  postgraduate, and :QP  denotes population 
aged six and above. This formula tends to overestimate average years of schooling, because it 
assumes that everybody completes every year of primary school, secondary school, high school 
and so on, etc., which is unlikely to be true. 
 
Figure A2. Average years of schooling calculations for 2000: This thesis vs NBS 
 
 
Figure A3. Average years of schooling calculations for 2010: This thesis vs NBS 
 











































Figure A4 plots human capital series calculated from Caselli (2005) and Peng (2011) for the 
four Tier-1 cities using my own estimates of average years of schooling. Peng 1 (“P1”) uses 
constant returns to education for the whole schooling period, although it does differentiate 
between Tier-1, 2, and 3 cities. Peng 2 (“P2”) not only differentiates between Tier-1, 2, and 3 
cities, but also applies different rates of return to different levels of schooling. Peng 2 is the 
series adopted in this thesis. It is the lowest of the three. Furthermore, it is only about half the 
size of Caselli (2005) (“C”) which is the highest series. This shows that when studying 
economic growth in China, it is important to construct human capital appropriately. Caselli’s 
results are well-known in the literature. But using his results would have overestimated human 
capital, which in turn would have reduced contributions from TFP. Furthermore, had I used 
average years of schooling published by the NBS, human capital would have been further 
inflated. 
 
















































































A.6 Accounting Exercises in Terms of the Capital-Output Ratio 
A.6.1 Growth Accounting  
In chapter 5.1, I present a decomposition of growth in output per worker in terms of capital-
labour ratio. Note that when there is an exogenous increase in TFP, capital per worker will rise, 
too. This growth in capital per worker is due to increases in TFP, but (12) attributes it to capital 
deepening. Therefore, it is informative to rewrite the production function in order to separate 
the effects of TFP growth. An equivalent way of expressing (10b) is 
 
y = y --.¶ ( (⁄ ) ¶-.¶ ℎ.                              (A2) 
 
This allows me to decompose differences in output per worker across cities into differences in 
the capital-output ratio, differences in human capital, and differences in productivity: 
 #N ( =  #N y +  #N( (⁄ ) + #N ℎ.                                                            (A3) 
 
A.6.2 Development Accounting  
Just as in growth accounting exercises where output could be expressed in both the capital-
labour ratio (K/L) and the capital-labour ratio (K/Y), the same could be done in development 
accounting.106 Now the factor only model is107 
 
(X∗ = ( (⁄ ) ¶-.¶ ℎ.                     (A4) 
 
My new measures of success are the same as before, except they now use the new factor-only 
model. I report (A4) for the same reason as Arezki and Cherif (2010) does to show that my 
results are invariant to different, albeit equivalent, representations of the production function. 
                                               
106 See, for example, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999). 
107 I follow the notation in Arezki and Cherif (2010) by adding an asteroid to indicate that the production function 
has been written in terms of the capital-output ratio. 
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A.7 Additional Results for Growth Accounting 
Table A3. Contributions to output per worker, 1994-2010 ( = 0.33) 
  Using the Provincial CPI Deflators for Output Using the Implicit GDP Deflator for China 
  Y/L TFP K/L h Y/L TFP K/L h 
Beijing 100.0 68.9 26.4 4.7 100.0 66.9 28.1 5.0 
Tianjin 100.0 58.3 38.2 3.5 100.0 53.9 42.2 3.9 
Shijiazhuang 100.0 37.3 59.7 3.0 100.0 23.4 72.9 3.7 
Taiyuan 100.0 59.0 35.7 5.3 100.0 55.8 38.5 5.7 
Hohhot 100.0 61.0 36.5 2.4 100.0 59.0 38.5 2.5 
Shenyang 100.0 46.5 49.2 4.3 100.0 39.5 55.6 4.8 
Dalian 100.0 44.7 52.3 3.1 100.0 37.1 59.5 3.5 
Changchun 100.0 39.8 57.5 2.7 100.0 31.7 65.3 3.1 
Harbin 100.0 56.3 41.4 2.3 100.0 50.5 46.9 2.6 
Shanghai 100.0 70.3 26.2 3.5 100.0 67.8 28.4 3.8 
Nanjing 100.0 30.6 63.4 6.0 100.0 21.0 72.1 6.9 
Hangzhou 100.0 34.8 61.8 3.4 100.0 24.5 71.6 3.9 
Ningbo 100.0 54.4 44.4 1.2 100.0 49.3 49.3 1.4 
Hefei 100.0 51.4 46.4 2.2 100.0 47.0 50.6 2.4 
Fuzhou 100.0 35.8 62.1 2.1 100.0 23.4 74.0 2.6 
Xiamen 100.0 43.7 51.1 5.2 100.0 30.5 63.1 6.4 
Nanchang 100.0 47.1 50.1 2.8 100.0 41.4 55.5 3.1 
Jinan 100.0 52.6 44.0 3.3 100.0 48.4 48.0 3.6 
Qingdao 100.0 54.5 43.1 2.4 100.0 50.4 46.9 2.6 
Zhengzhou 100.0 54.0 40.2 5.8 100.0 47.3 46.1 6.6 
Wuhan 100.0 50.6 44.5 4.9 100.0 47.1 47.6 5.3 
Changsha 100.0 46.7 50.4 2.8 100.0 44.0 53.0 3.0 
Guangzhou 100.0 67.4 29.1 3.5 100.0 61.5 34.3 4.2 
Shenzhen 100.0 70.2 26.8 2.9 100.0 63.8 32.6 3.6 
Nanning 100.0 41.1 57.8 1.1 100.0 31.2 67.6 1.3 
Haikou 100.0 59.8 25.7 14.5 100.0 -47.2 93.9 53.2 
Chongqing 100.0 28.2 70.2 1.7 100.0 12.5 85.5 2.0 
Chengdu 100.0 43.6 53.6 2.8 100.0 41.3 55.8 2.9 
Guiyang 100.0 37.0 60.9 2.1 100.0 33.0 64.7 2.2 
Kunming 100.0 28.5 69.7 1.7 100.0 24.1 74.1 1.8 
Xian 100.0 37.5 57.4 5.1 100.0 31.6 62.8 5.5 
Lanzhou 100.0 38.6 55.8 5.6 100.0 34.8 59.3 5.9 
Xining 100.0 51.1 47.8 1.1 100.0 52.7 46.3 1.1 
Yinchuan 100.0 63.7 33.4 2.9 100.0 61.4 35.5 3.1 
Urumqi 100.0 63.9 30.4 5.7 100.0 61.7 32.3 6.1 
Tangshan 100.0 54.5 43.5 2.1 100.0 48.5 49.1 2.4 
Qinhuangdao 100.0 50.0 47.0 3.0 100.0 39.3 57.0 3.7 
Baotou 100.0 63.2 35.1 1.7 100.0 61.4 36.8 1.8 
Dandong 100.0 20.4 77.7 1.9 100.0 4.0 93.7 2.3 
Jinzhou 100.0 58.0 40.5 1.4 100.0 50.4 47.9 1.7 
Jilin 100.0 56.0 42.5 1.6 100.0 49.8 48.4 1.8 
Mudanjiang 100.0 61.7 36.2 2.1 100.0 54.5 43.0 2.6 
Wuxi 100.0 41.9 55.8 2.3 100.0 34.9 62.6 2.6 
Xuzhou 100.0 22.3 75.9 1.8 100.0 7.1 90.7 2.2 
Yangzhou 100.0 57.2 41.4 1.3 100.0 51.3 47.2 1.5 
Wenzhou 100.0 46.0 52.6 1.4 100.0 39.6 58.8 1.6 
Jinhua 100.0 31.0 67.2 1.8 100.0 19.4 78.6 2.1 
Bengbu 100.0 34.2 63.8 2.0 100.0 24.7 73.0 2.3 
Anqing 100.0 67.2 31.2 1.6 100.0 62.4 35.7 1.9 
Quanzhou 100.0 55.8 41.6 2.6 100.0 48.2 48.7 3.1 
Jiujiang 100.0 61.2 37.2 1.6 100.0 56.8 41.5 1.7 
Ganzhou 100.0 51.9 47.2 0.9 100.0 46.2 52.7 1.0 
Yantai 100.0 43.2 55.0 1.8 100.0 38.6 59.5 1.9 
Jining 100.0 35.6 61.6 2.8 100.0 28.9 68.0 3.1 
Luoyang 100.0 36.5 62.4 1.1 100.0 28.8 70.0 1.2 
Pingdingshan 100.0 60.9 37.7 1.4 100.0 56.8 41.6 1.6 
Yichang 100.0 81.2 17.2 1.6 100.0 79.7 18.6 1.7 
Xiangyang 100.0 40.3 57.6 2.1 100.0 29.7 67.8 2.5 
Yueyang 100.0 70.8 26.8 2.4 100.0 69.0 28.4 2.5 
Changde 100.0 54.8 43.4 1.9 100.0 52.8 45.3 1.9 
Shaoguan 100.0 51.1 46.8 2.1 100.0 30.9 66.2 2.9 
Zhanjiang 100.0 74.3 23.5 2.2 100.0 69.1 28.3 2.6 
Huizhou 100.0 61.9 36.4 1.8 100.0 52.6 45.2 2.2 
Guilin 100.0 63.0 36.0 1.0 100.0 57.4 41.5 1.1 
Beihai 100.0 38.2 57.2 4.6 100.0 16.8 77.0 6.2 
Sanya 100.0 67.1 29.1 3.8 100.0 61.5 34.0 4.5 
Luzhou 100.0 47.7 51.4 1.0 100.0 44.0 55.0 1.0 
Nanchong 100.0 33.5 66.0 0.5 100.0 31.1 68.4 0.5 
Zunyi 100.0 42.3 57.3 0.4 100.0 38.3 61.3 0.4 
     Source: Own calculations based on data presented in Chapter 4. 
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Table A4. Contributions to output per worker, 1994-2010 ( = 0.65) 
  Using the Provincial CPI Deflators for Output Using the Implicit GDP Deflator for China 
  Y/L TFP K/L h Y/L TFP K/L h 
Beijing 100.0 45.6 52.0 2.4 100.0 42.0 55.3 2.6 
Tianjin 100.0 23.0 75.2 1.8 100.0 14.9 83.1 2.0 
Shijiazhuang 100.0 -19.1 117.6 1.6 100.0 -45.5 143.6 1.9 
Taiyuan 100.0 26.9 70.4 2.8 100.0 21.2 75.8 3.0 
Hohhot 100.0 26.8 72.0 1.3 100.0 22.9 75.8 1.3 
Shenyang 100.0 0.8 96.9 2.2 100.0 -12.1 109.5 2.5 
Dalian 100.0 -4.6 103.0 1.6 100.0 -18.9 117.1 1.8 
Changchun 100.0 -14.7 113.2 1.4 100.0 -30.1 128.5 1.6 
Harbin 100.0 17.3 81.5 1.2 100.0 6.3 92.4 1.4 
Shanghai 100.0 46.6 51.5 1.8 100.0 42.1 55.9 2.0 
Nanjing 100.0 -28.0 124.8 3.2 100.0 -45.7 142.1 3.6 
Hangzhou 100.0 -23.5 121.7 1.8 100.0 -43.0 141.0 2.0 
Ningbo 100.0 12.0 87.4 0.6 100.0 2.2 97.1 0.7 
Hefei 100.0 7.5 91.4 1.1 100.0 -1.0 99.7 1.2 
Fuzhou 100.0 -23.4 122.3 1.1 100.0 -47.2 145.8 1.3 
Xiamen 100.0 -3.4 100.7 2.7 100.0 -27.6 124.2 3.4 
Nanchang 100.0 -0.1 98.7 1.5 100.0 -11.0 109.4 1.6 
Jinan 100.0 11.5 86.8 1.7 100.0 3.6 94.5 1.9 
Qingdao 100.0 13.9 84.8 1.3 100.0 6.2 92.4 1.4 
Zhengzhou 100.0 17.7 79.3 3.0 100.0 5.8 90.7 3.4 
Wuhan 100.0 9.8 87.6 2.6 100.0 3.5 93.7 2.8 
Changsha 100.0 -0.8 99.4 1.5 100.0 -6.0 104.5 1.6 
Guangzhou 100.0 40.8 57.3 1.9 100.0 30.3 67.5 2.2 
Shenzhen 100.0 45.6 52.8 1.5 100.0 33.8 64.3 1.9 
Nanning 100.0 -14.5 113.9 0.6 100.0 -33.7 133.1 0.7 
Haikou 100.0 41.8 50.6 7.6 100.0 -112.8 185.0 27.8 
Chongqing 100.0 -39.1 138.2 0.9 100.0 -69.4 168.3 1.1 
Chengdu 100.0 -7.1 105.6 1.5 100.0 -11.4 109.9 1.5 
Guiyang 100.0 -21.1 120.0 1.1 100.0 -28.7 127.5 1.2 
Kunming 100.0 -38.2 137.3 0.9 100.0 -46.9 145.9 1.0 
Xian 100.0 -15.7 113.1 2.6 100.0 -26.6 123.7 2.9 
Lanzhou 100.0 -12.8 109.9 2.9 100.0 -19.8 116.7 3.1 
Xining 100.0 5.3 94.2 0.6 100.0 8.3 91.1 0.6 
Yinchuan 100.0 32.8 65.7 1.5 100.0 28.4 70.0 1.6 
Urumqi 100.0 37.1 59.9 3.0 100.0 33.2 63.6 3.2 
Tangshan 100.0 13.3 85.6 1.1 100.0 2.0 96.8 1.2 
Qinhuangdao 100.0 5.9 92.5 1.6 100.0 -14.2 112.3 1.9 
Baotou 100.0 30.0 69.1 0.9 100.0 26.6 72.4 0.9 
Dandong 100.0 -54.0 153.0 1.0 100.0 -85.7 184.5 1.2 
Jinzhou 100.0 19.4 79.9 0.7 100.0 4.7 94.4 0.9 
Jilin 100.0 15.5 83.7 0.8 100.0 3.7 95.4 0.9 
Mudanjiang 100.0 27.6 71.2 1.1 100.0 14.0 84.7 1.3 
Wuxi 100.0 -11.2 110.0 1.2 100.0 -24.6 123.3 1.3 
Xuzhou 100.0 -50.5 149.5 1.0 100.0 -79.8 178.6 1.1 
Yangzhou 100.0 17.7 81.6 0.7 100.0 6.2 93.0 0.8 
Wenzhou 100.0 -4.3 103.6 0.7 100.0 -16.7 115.9 0.8 
Jinhua 100.0 -33.3 132.4 0.9 100.0 -55.8 154.7 1.1 
Bengbu 100.0 -26.7 125.6 1.0 100.0 -45.0 143.9 1.2 
Anqing 100.0 37.7 61.4 0.8 100.0 28.7 70.3 1.0 
Quanzhou 100.0 16.7 81.9 1.4 100.0 2.4 96.0 1.6 
Jiujiang 100.0 25.8 73.4 0.8 100.0 17.4 81.7 0.9 
Ganzhou 100.0 6.6 92.9 0.5 100.0 -4.4 103.8 0.5 
Yantai 100.0 -9.3 108.3 0.9 100.0 -18.2 117.2 1.0 
Jining 100.0 -22.8 121.4 1.4 100.0 -35.6 134.0 1.6 
Luoyang 100.0 -23.4 122.8 0.6 100.0 -38.5 137.9 0.6 
Pingdingshan 100.0 25.0 74.2 0.8 100.0 17.1 82.0 0.8 
Yichang 100.0 65.3 33.8 0.8 100.0 62.5 36.6 0.9 
Xiangyang 100.0 -14.5 113.4 1.1 100.0 -34.8 133.5 1.3 
Yueyang 100.0 46.0 52.8 1.2 100.0 42.7 56.0 1.3 
Changde 100.0 13.6 85.4 1.0 100.0 9.8 89.2 1.0 
Shaoguan 100.0 6.6 92.3 1.1 100.0 -31.8 130.3 1.5 
Zhanjiang 100.0 52.6 46.3 1.1 100.0 43.0 55.6 1.4 
Huizhou 100.0 27.5 71.6 0.9 100.0 9.9 88.9 1.2 
Guilin 100.0 28.5 71.0 0.5 100.0 17.6 81.8 0.6 
Beihai 100.0 -15.0 112.6 2.4 100.0 -54.9 151.6 3.2 
Sanya 100.0 40.8 57.2 2.0 100.0 30.7 67.0 2.3 
Luzhou 100.0 -1.7 101.2 0.5 100.0 -8.9 108.3 0.5 
Nanchong 100.0 -30.3 130.0 0.3 100.0 -35.0 134.7 0.3 
Zunyi 100.0 -13.0 112.8 0.2 100.0 -20.9 120.7 0.2 





A.8 Growth Accounting in Terms of the Capital-Output Ratio 
When output per worker is expressed in terms of the capital-output ratio, all growth should be 
attributed to TFP along a balanced growth path. In other words, the contribution of TFP should 
be close to 100% if one believes that a city is along a balanced growth path. The rest comes 
from deviations from it such as increases in savings rate and average years of schooling. Results 
are presented in Table A5-A7. 
 
My results are not affected by how output per worker is decomposed. Indeed, whereas the 
numbers have changed, the rankings have not. Tier-1 cities still come out on top, Dandong and 
Nanchong at the bottom. Nevertheless, writing it in the capital-output ratio does change the 
interpretations. Capital intensity is the inverse of capital productivity. Thinking in terms of 
capital productivity is perhaps more intuitive. Tier-1 cities have all experienced falling capital 
intensity, which indicates increasing capital productivity. This also presents an interesting 
observation. There is debate in the literature as to whether an economy will become more or 
less capital-intensive as income rises.  
 
The experience of Tier-1 cities in China over the period 1994-2010 reveals falling capital 
intensity. Cities which have had high TFP contributions in the previous chapters are found with 
falling capital intensities, and vice versa. It suffices to say here that rich cities in China have 
been growing less capital intensive. This is an important observation. My dataset does not 
permit an investigation of the mechanisms or causes of falling capital intensity in well-
developed cities in China. But there are some interesting hypotheses. The first is a transition 
towards a service-centred economy. Surely, capital intensity varies widely within an industry, 
and the service sector does not necessarily possess high capital intensity. But the Chinese 
government has emphasised the expansion of the tertiary sector in recent years, especially in 
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the aftermath of the GFC which saw widespread layoffs. The service sector is praised for its 
capacity to absorb large numbers of workers and create employment for newly-graduated 
students.108 The second is that lower capital intensity gives firms an edge over their competitors, 
as less capital is required to generate a unit of output. This in turn means that less capital has 
to be replaced when old technology becomes obsolete. Ma et al. (2014) is a very informative 
study in this regard. Using data on Chinese firms, the authors show that when a firm decides 
to export, its capital intensity drops. They also show that a higher level of TFP is also associated 






























                                               
108 See, for example, http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2017/03/30/content_281475611731452.htm.  
 105
Table A5. Contributions to output per worker, 1994-2010 ( = 0.33, in terms of K/Y) 
 
  Using Provincial CPI Deflators for Output Using Implicit GDP Deflator for China 
  Y/L TFP K/Y h Y/L TFP K/Y h 
Beijing 100.0 102.9 -9.8 7.0 100.0 99.9 -7.3 7.4 
Tianjin 100.0 87.0 7.7 5.3 100.0 80.5 13.7 5.8 
Shijiazhuang 100.0 55.7 39.8 4.5 100.0 35.0 59.6 5.5 
Taiyuan 100.0 88.0 4.1 7.9 100.0 83.3 8.2 8.5 
Hohhot 100.0 91.1 5.3 3.6 100.0 88.0 8.2 3.8 
Shenyang 100.0 69.4 24.2 6.4 100.0 59.0 33.7 7.2 
Dalian 100.0 66.7 28.8 4.6 100.0 55.3 39.5 5.2 
Changchun 100.0 59.4 36.6 4.0 100.0 47.3 48.2 4.6 
Harbin 100.0 84.1 12.5 3.4 100.0 75.4 20.7 3.9 
Shanghai 100.0 105.0 -10.2 5.2 100.0 101.2 -6.9 5.6 
Nanjing 100.0 45.7 45.3 9.0 100.0 31.3 58.4 10.3 
Hangzhou 100.0 52.0 43.0 5.0 100.0 36.6 57.6 5.8 
Ningbo 100.0 81.2 16.9 1.9 100.0 73.6 24.3 2.1 
Hefei 100.0 76.8 20.0 3.2 100.0 70.1 26.3 3.5 
Fuzhou 100.0 53.4 43.4 3.2 100.0 34.9 61.2 3.8 
Xiamen 100.0 65.2 27.0 7.8 100.0 45.5 44.9 9.6 
Nanchang 100.0 70.3 25.5 4.2 100.0 61.8 33.6 4.6 
Jinan 100.0 78.5 16.5 5.0 100.0 72.2 22.4 5.4 
Qingdao 100.0 81.4 15.0 3.6 100.0 75.3 20.8 4.0 
Zhengzhou 100.0 80.6 10.8 8.6 100.0 70.7 19.5 9.9 
Wuhan 100.0 75.5 17.1 7.4 100.0 70.3 21.8 7.9 
Changsha 100.0 69.7 26.0 4.2 100.0 65.6 29.9 4.5 
Guangzhou 100.0 100.5 -5.8 5.3 100.0 91.8 1.9 6.2 
Shenzhen 100.0 104.8 -9.2 4.4 100.0 95.2 -0.5 5.3 
Nanning 100.0 61.3 37.1 1.6 100.0 46.5 51.6 1.9 
Haikou 100.0 89.2 -10.9 21.7 100.0 -70.4 91.0 79.4 
Chongqing 100.0 42.0 55.5 2.5 100.0 18.7 78.3 3.0 
Chengdu 100.0 65.0 30.8 4.2 100.0 61.6 34.0 4.4 
Guiyang 100.0 55.2 41.6 3.1 100.0 49.3 47.4 3.3 
Kunming 100.0 42.6 54.8 2.6 100.0 36.0 61.3 2.7 
Xian 100.0 56.0 36.4 7.5 100.0 47.2 44.5 8.3 
Lanzhou 100.0 57.6 34.0 8.3 100.0 52.0 39.2 8.8 
Xining 100.0 76.2 22.1 1.7 100.0 78.6 19.8 1.6 
Yinchuan 100.0 95.1 0.5 4.4 100.0 91.6 3.8 4.7 
Urumqi 100.0 95.4 -3.9 8.5 100.0 92.0 -1.1 9.0 
Tangshan 100.0 81.3 15.6 3.1 100.0 72.4 24.1 3.5 
Qinhuangdao 100.0 74.7 20.8 4.5 100.0 58.7 35.9 5.5 
Baotou 100.0 94.3 3.1 2.6 100.0 91.6 5.6 2.7 
Dandong 100.0 30.4 66.7 2.9 100.0 6.0 90.6 3.5 
Jinzhou 100.0 86.6 11.3 2.1 100.0 75.2 22.3 2.5 
Jilin 100.0 83.5 14.1 2.3 100.0 74.3 23.0 2.6 
Mudanjiang 100.0 92.1 4.7 3.2 100.0 81.3 14.9 3.8 
Wuxi 100.0 62.5 34.1 3.4 100.0 52.1 44.1 3.8 
Xuzhou 100.0 33.2 64.1 2.7 100.0 10.7 86.1 3.2 
Yangzhou 100.0 85.4 12.6 2.0 100.0 76.5 21.2 2.2 
Wenzhou 100.0 68.7 29.2 2.1 100.0 59.1 38.5 2.3 
Jinhua 100.0 46.3 51.1 2.7 100.0 28.9 68.0 3.1 
Bengbu 100.0 51.1 46.0 3.0 100.0 36.9 59.8 3.4 
Anqing 100.0 100.3 -2.7 2.4 100.0 93.2 4.0 2.8 
Quanzhou 100.0 83.3 12.8 3.9 100.0 71.9 23.5 4.6 
Jiujiang 100.0 91.3 6.3 2.3 100.0 84.7 12.7 2.6 
Ganzhou 100.0 77.5 21.2 1.4 100.0 69.0 29.4 1.6 
Yantai 100.0 64.5 32.8 2.6 100.0 57.6 39.6 2.8 
Jining 100.0 53.1 42.7 4.1 100.0 43.2 52.2 4.6 
Luoyang 100.0 54.5 43.8 1.6 100.0 42.9 55.2 1.8 
Pingdingshan 100.0 90.9 7.0 2.1 100.0 84.7 12.9 2.4 
Yichang 100.0 121.2 -23.6 2.4 100.0 118.9 -21.5 2.6 
Xiangyang 100.0 60.2 36.7 3.1 100.0 44.4 51.9 3.7 
Yueyang 100.0 105.7 -9.3 3.5 100.0 103.0 -6.8 3.8 
Changde 100.0 81.8 15.5 2.8 100.0 78.8 18.3 2.9 
Shaoguan 100.0 76.3 20.7 3.1 100.0 46.2 49.5 4.3 
Zhanjiang 100.0 110.9 -14.2 3.3 100.0 103.2 -7.1 3.9 
Huizhou 100.0 92.3 5.0 2.7 100.0 78.5 18.1 3.3 
Guilin 100.0 94.0 4.5 1.4 100.0 85.6 12.7 1.7 
Beihai 100.0 57.1 36.1 6.9 100.0 25.1 65.6 9.2 
Sanya 100.0 100.2 -5.9 5.7 100.0 91.8 1.5 6.7 
Luzhou 100.0 71.1 27.4 1.4 100.0 65.6 32.8 1.5 
Nanchong 100.0 49.9 49.3 0.8 100.0 46.4 52.8 0.8 
Zunyi 100.0 63.2 36.2 0.6 100.0 57.1 42.2 0.7 




Table A6. Contributions to output per worker, 1994-2010, ( = 0.65, in terms of K/Y) 
  Using Provincial CPI Deflators for Output Using Implicit GDP Deflator for China 
  Y/L TFP K/Y h Y/L TFP K/Y h 
Beijing 100.0 130.1 -37.1 7.0 100.0 120.1 -27.6 7.4 
Tianjin 100.0 65.7 29.0 5.3 100.0 42.5 51.7 5.8 
Shijiazhuang 100.0 -54.6 150.1 4.5 100.0 -130.0 224.6 5.5 
Taiyuan 100.0 76.8 15.3 7.9 100.0 60.6 30.9 8.5 
Hohhot 100.0 76.4 20.0 3.6 100.0 65.4 30.8 3.8 
Shenyang 100.0 2.4 91.3 6.4 100.0 -34.5 127.2 7.2 
Dalian 100.0 -13.0 108.5 4.6 100.0 -54.1 148.9 5.2 
Changchun 100.0 -41.9 137.8 4.0 100.0 -86.1 181.6 4.6 
Harbin 100.0 49.4 47.1 3.4 100.0 18.0 78.2 3.9 
Shanghai 100.0 133.2 -38.5 5.2 100.0 120.3 -26.0 5.6 
Nanjing 100.0 -79.9 170.9 9.0 100.0 -130.5 220.2 10.3 
Hangzhou 100.0 -67.1 162.1 5.0 100.0 -122.9 217.1 5.8 
Ningbo 100.0 34.3 63.9 1.9 100.0 6.3 91.7 2.1 
Hefei 100.0 21.4 75.3 3.2 100.0 -2.8 99.2 3.5 
Fuzhou 100.0 -66.8 163.6 3.2 100.0 -134.7 230.9 3.8 
Xiamen 100.0 -9.7 101.9 7.8 100.0 -78.8 169.1 9.6 
Nanchang 100.0 -0.4 96.2 4.2 100.0 -31.4 126.8 4.6 
Jinan 100.0 32.9 62.2 5.0 100.0 10.3 84.3 5.4 
Qingdao 100.0 39.7 56.6 3.6 100.0 17.8 78.3 4.0 
Zhengzhou 100.0 50.6 40.8 8.6 100.0 16.7 73.4 9.9 
Wuhan 100.0 28.0 64.6 7.4 100.0 10.1 82.0 7.9 
Changsha 100.0 -2.4 98.2 4.2 100.0 -17.2 112.8 4.5 
Guangzhou 100.0 116.7 -22.0 5.3 100.0 86.5 7.3 6.2 
Shenzhen 100.0 130.4 -34.7 4.4 100.0 96.7 -2.0 5.3 
Nanning 100.0 -41.4 139.8 1.6 100.0 -96.4 194.5 1.9 
Haikou 100.0 119.5 -41.2 21.7 100.0 -322.4 343.0 79.4 
Chongqing 100.0 -111.6 209.1 2.5 100.0 -198.2 295.2 3.0 
Chengdu 100.0 -20.3 116.1 4.2 100.0 -32.7 128.3 4.4 
Guiyang 100.0 -60.2 157.0 3.1 100.0 -81.9 178.5 3.3 
Kunming 100.0 -109.2 206.6 2.6 100.0 -133.9 231.1 2.7 
Xian 100.0 -44.9 137.3 7.5 100.0 -76.1 167.8 8.3 
Lanzhou 100.0 -36.6 128.3 8.3 100.0 -56.6 147.8 8.8 
Xining 100.0 15.0 83.3 1.7 100.0 23.8 74.6 1.6 
Yinchuan 100.0 93.6 2.0 4.4 100.0 81.1 14.2 4.7 
Urumqi 100.0 106.1 -14.6 8.5 100.0 94.9 -4.0 9.0 
Tangshan 100.0 38.0 58.9 3.1 100.0 5.6 90.9 3.5 
Qinhuangdao 100.0 16.9 78.6 4.5 100.0 -40.7 135.2 5.5 
Baotou 100.0 85.8 11.6 2.6 100.0 76.0 21.3 2.7 
Dandong 100.0 -154.4 251.5 2.9 100.0 -244.9 341.5 3.5 
Jinzhou 100.0 55.4 42.5 2.1 100.0 13.5 84.0 2.5 
Jilin 100.0 44.3 53.3 2.3 100.0 10.6 86.8 2.6 
Mudanjiang 100.0 78.9 17.8 3.2 100.0 40.0 56.2 3.8 
Wuxi 100.0 -31.9 128.5 3.4 100.0 -70.2 166.4 3.8 
Xuzhou 100.0 -144.3 241.5 2.7 100.0 -227.9 324.6 3.2 
Yangzhou 100.0 50.5 47.5 2.0 100.0 17.6 80.1 2.2 
Wenzhou 100.0 -12.3 110.3 2.1 100.0 -47.6 145.3 2.3 
Jinhua 100.0 -95.2 192.6 2.7 100.0 -159.5 256.4 3.1 
Bengbu 100.0 -76.2 173.3 3.0 100.0 -128.7 225.3 3.4 
Anqing 100.0 107.8 -10.2 2.4 100.0 82.0 15.2 2.8 
Quanzhou 100.0 47.8 48.3 3.9 100.0 6.8 88.6 4.6 
Jiujiang 100.0 73.8 23.9 2.3 100.0 49.7 47.7 2.6 
Ganzhou 100.0 18.8 79.8 1.4 100.0 -12.5 111.0 1.6 
Yantai 100.0 -26.4 123.8 2.6 100.0 -52.0 149.2 2.8 
Jining 100.0 -65.2 161.1 4.1 100.0 -101.6 197.0 4.6 
Luoyang 100.0 -66.8 165.2 1.6 100.0 -110.1 208.2 1.8 
Pingdingshan 100.0 71.5 26.3 2.1 100.0 49.0 48.6 2.4 
Yichang 100.0 186.6 -89.0 2.4 100.0 178.4 -81.0 2.6 
Xiangyang 100.0 -41.5 138.4 3.1 100.0 -99.5 195.8 3.7 
Yueyang 100.0 131.4 -35.0 3.5 100.0 121.9 -25.6 3.8 
Changde 100.0 39.0 58.3 2.8 100.0 28.0 69.1 2.9 
Shaoguan 100.0 19.0 77.9 3.1 100.0 -90.9 186.6 4.3 
Zhanjiang 100.0 150.2 -53.5 3.3 100.0 122.8 -26.7 3.9 
Huizhou 100.0 78.5 18.9 2.7 100.0 28.3 68.4 3.3 
Guilin 100.0 81.5 17.1 1.4 100.0 50.4 47.9 1.7 
Beihai 100.0 -42.8 136.0 6.9 100.0 -156.7 247.5 9.2 
Sanya 100.0 116.5 -22.2 5.7 100.0 87.7 5.6 6.7 
Luzhou 100.0 -4.9 103.4 1.4 100.0 -25.4 123.8 1.5 
Nanchong 100.0 -86.6 185.8 0.8 100.0 -100.0 199.2 0.8 




Table A7. Contributions to output per worker, 1994-2010 ( = 0.5, in terms of K/Y) 
  
Using the Provincial CPI Deflators 
for Output 
Using the Implicit GDP Deflator for 
China 
  Y/L TFP K/Y h Y/L TFP K/Y h 
Beijing 100.0 113.0 -20.0 7.0 100.0 107.4 -14.9 7.4 
Tianjin 100.0 79.1 15.6 5.3 100.0 66.3 27.8 5.8 
Shijiazhuang 100.0 14.7 80.8 4.5 100.0 -26.4 120.9 5.5 
Taiyuan 100.0 83.9 8.2 7.9 100.0 74.9 16.6 8.5 
Hohhot 100.0 85.7 10.7 3.6 100.0 79.6 16.6 3.8 
Shenyang 100.0 44.5 49.1 6.4 100.0 24.3 68.5 7.2 
Dalian 100.0 37.0 58.4 4.6 100.0 14.6 80.2 5.2 
Changchun 100.0 21.8 74.2 4.0 100.0 -2.3 97.8 4.6 
Harbin 100.0 71.2 25.4 3.4 100.0 54.0 42.1 3.9 
Shanghai 100.0 115.5 -20.7 5.2 100.0 108.3 -14.0 5.6 
Nanjing 100.0 -1.0 92.0 9.0 100.0 -28.8 118.6 10.3 
Hangzhou 100.0 7.7 87.3 5.0 100.0 -22.7 116.9 5.8 
Ningbo 100.0 63.7 34.4 1.9 100.0 48.6 49.4 2.1 
Hefei 100.0 56.2 40.6 3.2 100.0 43.0 53.4 3.5 
Fuzhou 100.0 8.7 88.1 3.2 100.0 -28.2 124.3 3.8 
Xiamen 100.0 37.3 54.9 7.8 100.0 -0.7 91.1 9.6 
Nanchang 100.0 44.0 51.8 4.2 100.0 27.1 68.3 4.6 
Jinan 100.0 61.5 33.5 5.0 100.0 49.2 45.4 5.4 
Qingdao 100.0 65.9 30.5 3.6 100.0 53.9 42.1 4.0 
Zhengzhou 100.0 69.4 22.0 8.6 100.0 50.6 39.5 9.9 
Wuhan 100.0 57.8 34.8 7.4 100.0 47.9 44.2 7.9 
Changsha 100.0 42.9 52.9 4.2 100.0 34.8 60.7 4.5 
Guangzhou 100.0 106.5 -11.8 5.3 100.0 89.8 3.9 6.2 
Shenzhen 100.0 114.3 -18.7 4.4 100.0 95.7 -1.1 5.3 
Nanning 100.0 23.1 75.3 1.6 100.0 -6.6 104.7 1.9 
Haikou 100.0 100.5 -22.2 21.7 100.0 -164.1 184.7 79.4 
Chongqing 100.0 -15.1 112.6 2.5 100.0 -62.0 158.9 3.0 
Chengdu 100.0 33.3 62.5 4.2 100.0 26.5 69.1 4.4 
Guiyang 100.0 12.3 84.6 3.1 100.0 0.5 96.1 3.3 
Kunming 100.0 -13.9 111.3 2.6 100.0 -27.2 124.4 2.7 
Xian 100.0 18.5 74.0 7.5 100.0 1.4 90.4 8.3 
Lanzhou 100.0 22.6 69.1 8.3 100.0 11.6 79.6 8.8 
Xining 100.0 53.5 44.9 1.7 100.0 58.2 40.2 1.6 
Yinchuan 100.0 94.5 1.1 4.4 100.0 87.7 7.6 4.7 
Urumqi 100.0 99.4 -7.9 8.5 100.0 93.1 -2.1 9.0 
Tangshan 100.0 65.2 31.7 3.1 100.0 47.6 48.9 3.5 
Qinhuangdao 100.0 53.2 42.3 4.5 100.0 21.7 72.8 5.5 
Baotou 100.0 91.2 6.3 2.6 100.0 85.8 11.5 2.7 
Dandong 100.0 -38.3 135.4 2.9 100.0 -87.3 183.9 3.5 
Jinzhou 100.0 75.0 22.9 2.1 100.0 52.3 45.2 2.5 
Jilin 100.0 69.0 28.7 2.3 100.0 50.6 46.7 2.6 
Mudanjiang 100.0 87.2 9.6 3.2 100.0 65.9 30.2 3.8 
Wuxi 100.0 27.4 69.2 3.4 100.0 6.6 89.6 3.8 
Xuzhou 100.0 -32.8 130.1 2.7 100.0 -78.1 174.8 3.2 
Yangzhou 100.0 72.4 25.6 2.0 100.0 54.6 43.1 2.2 
Wenzhou 100.0 38.5 59.4 2.1 100.0 19.4 78.2 2.3 
Jinhua 100.0 -6.3 103.7 2.7 100.0 -41.1 138.0 3.1 
Bengbu 100.0 3.7 93.3 3.0 100.0 -24.7 121.3 3.4 
Anqing 100.0 103.1 -5.5 2.4 100.0 89.0 8.2 2.8 
Quanzhou 100.0 70.1 26.0 3.9 100.0 47.7 47.7 4.6 
Jiujiang 100.0 84.8 12.9 2.3 100.0 71.7 25.7 2.6 
Ganzhou 100.0 55.7 43.0 1.4 100.0 38.7 59.8 1.6 
Yantai 100.0 30.7 66.7 2.6 100.0 16.8 80.3 2.8 
Jining 100.0 9.1 86.7 4.1 100.0 -10.6 106.1 4.6 
Luoyang 100.0 9.4 88.9 1.6 100.0 -14.0 112.1 1.8 
Pingdingshan 100.0 83.7 14.2 2.1 100.0 71.4 26.2 2.4 
Yichang 100.0 145.6 -47.9 2.4 100.0 141.1 -43.6 2.6 
Xiangyang 100.0 22.3 74.5 3.1 100.0 -9.1 105.4 3.7 
Yueyang 100.0 115.3 -18.8 3.5 100.0 110.1 -13.8 3.8 
Changde 100.0 65.9 31.4 2.8 100.0 59.9 37.2 2.9 
Shaoguan 100.0 55.0 42.0 3.1 100.0 -4.8 100.5 4.3 
Zhanjiang 100.0 125.5 -28.8 3.3 100.0 110.5 -14.4 3.9 
Huizhou 100.0 87.2 10.2 2.7 100.0 59.8 36.8 3.3 
Guilin 100.0 89.4 9.2 1.4 100.0 72.5 25.8 1.7 
Beihai 100.0 19.9 73.2 6.9 100.0 -42.5 133.3 9.2 
Sanya 100.0 106.2 -11.9 5.7 100.0 90.3 3.0 6.7 
Luzhou 100.0 42.9 55.7 1.4 100.0 31.8 66.7 1.5 
Nanchong 100.0 -0.8 100.0 0.8 100.0 -8.1 107.3 0.8 
Zunyi 100.0 25.8 73.5 0.6 100.0 13.6 85.7 0.7 
     Source: Own calculations based on data presented in Chapter 4. 
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A.9 Expressing Output per Worker in Terms of the Capital-Output Ratio  
Decomposing GDP per worker in terms of the capital-output ratio is equivalent to decomposing 
it in terms of capital per worker. The only difference is that TFP now affects the factor-only 
model through y, as y depends on A. Caselli (2005, p. 688) notes that the decomposition in 
terms of the capital-output ratio is not suitable for answering the question of what income levels 
will be if all cities had the same level of TFP. Instead, cUTT$cc2 now measures the expected 
change in (X∗  given a small change in y (see Equation (A4)).109 
 
Figure A5. Decomposing y in terms of K/Y: Using the provincial CPI series 
 
 
The most notable feature in Figure A5 is that (X∗  varies more than (X  at the start of the 
sample period. Therefore, I see cUTT$cc and cUTT$cc reaching above one, which means that 
the factor-only model predicts larger variations in output per worker than the full model. Caselli 
(2005) provides an intuitive explanation for the dynamics between ·')#N(()  and 
·')#N((X∗ ). It is slightly modified here, but the idea is the same. Note that (X∗ = yy   , 
which suggests that 
                                               



































·')#N((X∗ ) = ·')#N(() + ¸ ¹ ·')#N(y) + 2Qs ºln(() ,  ln(y)».             (A5) 
 
Depending on the relative weight of the terms on the right-hand side, ·')#N((X∗ ) could be 
greater or less than ·')#N(() . Also note that cUTT$cc  is even higher than cUTT$cc . 
Looking at (25), the TFP term may have the effect of amplifying or damping y. Therefore, the 
ratio between the 90th and 10th percentile of (X∗  is greater than that between y. Over time, as 
TFP increases, y is damped, and cUTT$cc  falls below one. This is the shortcoming of 
decomposing output per worker in terms of the capital-output ratio when doing development 
accounting, that is, (X∗  is not invariant to changes in TFP. Figure A6 shows that using the 
World Bank GDP deflator series do not change the results. Early on during the sample period, 
the factor-only model overestimates variation in income, mainly due to it being influenced by 
TFP. Over time its explanatory power declines. This is similar to when output per worker is 
expressed in in terms of the capital-labour ratio. 
 
Figure A6. Decomposing y in terms of K/Y: Using the World Bank GDP deflator series 
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A.10 Time-Varying Factor Income Shares and TFP Levels 
Development accounting with Cobb-Douglas production function requires that  be constant 
across cities. Here I provide a simple proof. Let subscripts indicate different cities. Output per 
worker in in each city can be expressed as follows: 
 ( = yℎ.                   (A6) 
 ( = yℎ.                   (A7) 
 
Dividing (A6) over (A7) gives 
 
G-G+ = -+ ¸-+¹
 ¸I-I+¹

.                                        (A8) 
 
Taking logarithms gives 
 
ln ¸G-G+¹ = ln ¸-+¹ +  ln ¸-+¹ + (1 − ) ln ¸I-I+¹ .               (A9) 
 
Note the absence of subscripts on . It is this uniformity of  across cities which allows the 
capital endowments term to be raised to a common exponent. Development accounting with 
Cobb-Douglas production function is invalid without the assumption of the same factor shares 
across countries (see also Sturgill, 2014). One can develop a similar line of reasoning for the 
growth accounting exercises. 
 
In a departure from the standard approach in the literature, I provide an exercise with a more 
flexible formulation that does not assume a common labour share across cities. Specifically, I 
use the Törnqvist quantity index to calculate TFP levels relative to Shanghai in order to 
investigate the effect of time-varying factor income shares. A second-order approximation to 
 111
the production function is the Törnqvist quantity index of factor inputs ¼½, which can be used 
for comparing productivity levels between two cities i and j at a given time:  
 
ln7Q¿,À,ÁÂ ; =  7α¿,Á + αÀ,Á;ln ±¯,°,² + º1 −  7α¿,Á + αÀ,Á;» ln ±I¯,­¯,I°,­°,².                        (A10) 
 
In my empirical implementation, I use Shanghai as the base city, so all cities i are compared to 
j=Shanghai. I use the time series of the adjusted labour income shares, which are discussed in 
Chapter 4.7. Relative TFP levels are calculated as: 
 
ÃÄ:,Å, = Æ̄ Æ° Ç¯,°,È .                             (A11) 
 
Figure A7 shows that allowing  to vary over time does not significantly alter relative TFP 
levels. Figure A7 only shows the analysis for the first-tier cities. I also observe similar 
behaviour for other cities. This is not surprising since  does not vary much during the sample 
period (see Table 4), fluctuating around 0.5 during the sample period. 
 
Figure A7. TFP levels relative to Shanghai with time-varying factor income shares 
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A.11 Discussion of the Correlations 
 
The correlations I report in Figure 11-14 are Pearson’s correlation coefficients, which measure 
the amount of linear dependence between two series, laying a straight line through the 
scatterplot and calculates its slope. That is exactly what I do in each panel in Figure 11-14. One 
can raise two immediate points regarding the associations observed in data in each panel of 
Figure 11-14. The first concern is that reported correlations will change if one takes the 
logarithms since taking logarithm can be thought as a nonlinear transformation and so in 
general correlations will change.110 The second concern is whether excluding Shenzhen would 
change the associations I observe in data significantly. Table A8 addresses these two concerns. 
The qualitative nature of my results remains the same.  
 
Table A8. Alternative specifications and correlations 
 
(a): Correlations in levels 











Shenzhen ( (É⁄  ( (É⁄  ( (É⁄  ( (É⁄  ℎ ℎÉ⁄  0.2254 -0.0145 0.3868 0.2654  É⁄  0.7671 0.5528 0.8190 0.8739 y yÉ⁄  0.6545 0.6258 0.9510 0.8951 
(b): Correlations in logs 











Shenzhen ln(( (É⁄ ) ln(( (É⁄ ) ln(( (É⁄ ) ln(( (É⁄ ) ln(ℎ ℎÉ⁄ ) 0.1087 -0.0207 0.3277 0.2383 ln( É⁄ ) 0.7344 0.6957 0.8793 0.8799 ln(y yÉ⁄ ) 0.6397 0.5945 0.9181 0.8990 
 
                                               
110 A linear transformation preserves linear relationships between variables. Therefore, the correlation between 
two series would be unchanged after a linear transformation. 
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A.12 Income Convergence among Cities 
Two types of convergence are recognised in the literature: -convergence and -convergence. 
At a most intuitive level, σ-convergence is where economies converge in income levels over 
time, and -convergence is when economies which are poor at the beginning of the period have 
been growing faster than rich ones (Young et al., 2008). Furthermore, there are two types of 
-convergence: absolute and conditional. When economies are assumed to be converging to 
the same steady state, it is said to be absolute. When economies are converging to different 
steady states, it is said to be conditional. 
 
Panel (a) in Figure A8 shows evidence of -convergence. Poor cities have been growing faster 
than rich ones over the period. Panel (b) in Figure A8 shows that, when focusing on Tier-1 and 
2 cities, that is, only 35 cities, the correlation gets slightly stronger. I test for unconditional -
convergence for 69-city and 35-city samples separately with the following two regressions: 
 
∆ ln( ⁄ ) =   +  ln( ⁄ ) + Ì,,        i=1,2,…,69,                                            (A12) 
 
∆ ln( ⁄ ) =   +  ln( ⁄ ) + Ì,,        i=1,2,…,35,                                            (A13) 
 
where ∆#N( ⁄ ) is the average labour productivity growth rate in the 1994-2010 period, and 
ln( ⁄ ) is the initial productivity for city i, and Ì is a stochastic error term. Here  and 
  determine the relationship between initial labour productivities and subsequent growth 
rates. The results of regressing equations (A12) and (A13) are shown in Table A9. The 
estimated coefficients of   and   are negative. However, only   is significant (and it is 
significant at the 10% level). The null hypothesis of no -convergence cannot be rejected for 
the 35-city sample.  
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Figure A8. Income convergence among the Chinese cities, 1994-2010 
 









Table A9. Cross-section estimates of unconditional convergence 
 
                      ∆#N( ⁄ ) 
  
∆#N( ⁄ ) 
     18.58*** 
 




      (8.056) 
    -0.919*                                          
 




    (0.818) 
    R2 0.035    R2    0.037 
                             Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Source: Own calculations based on data presented in Chapter 4. 
 
